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

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APRIL 21, 1980

The Trouble With Teddy

NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN **p. 13**

Chappaquiddick? Bah, humbug! A mediocre legislative record? Who cares? A bumblemouth? So what? This is a Kennedy we're talking about, for heaven's sake.

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

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A WORD FROM THE PUBLISHER

BY THE SUMMER OF 1914, Europe had become inured to crises. Fiercely armed, and divided into hostile alliances, it had weathered two crises over Morocco, one over Bosnia, the Balkan wars. When the archduke was murdered by Serbian terrorists, no one realized that the ever-present danger had taken a quantum leap. As the crisis deepened, some tried to turn it to their advantage, while others made desperate efforts to stem the tide of war. But decades of distrust and hair-trigger war plans proved decisive. Suddenly, it seemed, events had escaped from anyone's control. Russia mobilized, and Germany saw itself as threatened in its most vital interests. The ultimatums to France and Russia followed, then the holocaust of the Great War. You might keep this in mind as you read our symposium on the new Cold War.

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

"A billion pounds to the first person who destroys Oslo!"

■ Norway has launched an astonishing scheme to conserve stocks of fish . . . by paying fishermen to sink their own boats.

When 63-year-old John Skaatoey sent his 121-foot boat, Spirit, to the bottom of an icy fjord near Bergen last week, he collected £250,000.

—*The Sunday Times (London), Jan. 27, 1980*

Quick, Thelma, finish your shopping. It's almost noon.

■ Two D.C. Superior Court judges have drafted a proposal that would prohibit persons charged with certain narcotics and prostitution crimes from traveling into alleged high-crime areas of the city, including parts of downtown Washington.

The proposal by Judge Tim Murphy, chief of the criminal division, and Judge David L. Norman would bar persons with extensive narcotics or prostitution records from going into the restricted areas between noon and 5 P.M. and after 8 P.M.

Persons subject to the restrictions would be allowed to pass through the areas "in a bus, taxi, or car so long as you do not stop anywhere (except at traffic signals)," according to the proposal.

—*Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1980*

At last a direct route from Great Driffield to Louth

■ The world's longest single-span suspension bridge, four years late and over five times in excess of budget, is finally sweeping toward completion over the Humber River, the last major unbridged stream in Britain.

But the bridge, with its white concrete towers looming over the graceful span on which the first dabs of green paint have been applied, may become a financial disaster. The main problem is that the bridge, a civic dream for a century, does not really go anywhere and that hardly anyone shows signs of wanting to use it.

—*New York Times, Mar. 8, 1980*

Judge astrologically ordained to sentence rapist to jail despite plea of insanity

■ When Mark Quinn Denton was born in Pontiac, Mich., at 8:14 P.M. Aug. 8, 1956, his lawyer says it was in the stars that he would commit rape, robbery and aggravated assault in Plantation, Fla., 23 years later.

He was, says Miami Beach attorney Jack Nageley, a prisoner of destiny.

"It was the law of karma," Nageley said. "He has no control whatsoever over his behavior."

To keep Quinn, an ex-convict, from being returned to jail as a prisoner of the state, Nageley said he will use what he calls an unprecedented "astrology defense" to bolster Quinn's plea of innocent by reason of insanity.

"This case will be spirit versus matter. It could revolutionize criminal defense," said Nageley.

"I was surprised to say the least," said Broward Assistant State Attorney Marshall Platt. "To my knowledge, astrology has never been used in the state of Florida to prove insanity. I don't think it can be used."

—*Miami Herald, Feb. 27, 1980*

He was also charged with interstate transportation of a reptile

■ Harold McKeehan of Somerville [Mass.] was arrested on charges of breaking and entering Friday night. He was booked, fingerprinted and photographed at Suffolk County Jail before officers noticed he had a two-foot-long iguana in his pocket.

The iguana, known as Mento, turned up during the standard strip search.

"It was stuffed in his pocket," spokesman Gregg Wilson said. "The amazing thing was he went through a couple of steps, from arrest to booking, without anyone knowing it was there."

Wilson said McKeehan did not explain why he was carrying the iguana.

—*Los Angeles Times, Mar. 10, 1980*

Texas army masses at Ohio border . . .

■ During recent U.S. Senate debate over the proposed tax on oil company profits, Senator John Danforth, a Missouri Republican, waxed patriotic and indignant over "economic warfare." The object of his wrath, however, was not OPEC but Texas. He suggested an amendment to the Carter Administration's windfall profits bill that would have added a 75 percent tax on oil produced on state-owned land, revenue that is currently exempt.

"The state of Texas has a substantial surplus in its budget now," Danforth warned. "What is the effect if we funnel an additional $33 billion, over a decade, into the state government of Texas? We would arm that state with tremendous economic power that can be used against the rest of the country."

—*Texas Monthly, March 1980*

. . . Cincinnati defended to last person

■ While President Carter's plan to have women register for military service appears headed for defeat in Congress, an obscure Ohio law gives the governor power to draft women any time he sees fit.

That power goes back to 1961 when the Ohio law providing for an unorganized militia was changed to include all able-bodied citizens of the state instead of just able-bodied males.

The man responsible for writing the change was Major General Loren G. Windom of Reynoldsburg, who was Ohio's adjutant general at the time.

"I said [to the legislative committee holding hearings on changes in the state code], 'I can only hope that in the event an emergency arises, the women of Ohio can be as heroic as the women of Stalingrad,'" the retired National Guard official recounted.

—*Miami Herald, Mar. 3, 1980*

Arrive early, stay late

■ An elegant Colombian who makes ends meet by crashing diplomatic receptions and funeral wakes where food and drinks are served apparently is among the hostages held by guerrillas in the Dominican Republic Embassy.

Bogota newspapers have identified him as Jose Antonio Valencia, a snappy dresser famous for being a professional moocher.

On the day of the attack, Valencia was among the early arrivals, apparently so he would not miss out on the canapes and free drinks.

—*Los Angeles Times, Mar. 8, 1980*

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Latest liberal crusade

Saint John?

RONALD REAGAN'S CRUSHING VICTORY in the March 18 Illinois primary has put the boots to the most improbable story of the 1980 campaign: the exuberant love affair between the nation's liberals and Representative John Anderson of Illinois. While the dim specter of an independent Anderson race remains, Reagan's triumph in Anderson's home state (48 percent to 37 percent), coming on the heels of polls showing a narrow Anderson lead and Anderson's endorsement by Chicago's two daily newspapers, has effectively ended Anderson's quest for the Republican nomination. Norman Lear, Stanley Sheinbaum, Paul Newman, Stewart Mott, and countless college students have clearly saddled themselves with another Lost Cause.

But was the Cause worth it? To a large extent, liberals have been the victims of media hype, to which they were particularly vulnerable in this dismal political year. In the first place, one attraction of Anderson has been, let's face it, the vulgar if cosmically trivial fact that he looks like a President: the silver thatch, the bulging eyes, the evangelical stem-winding oratory, the total lack of humor—to liberals this meant he was a serious statesman.

The official line on Anderson is that he is the only man of ideas and man of courage in the Republican stable. "At last, a Republican candidate with ideas," was a common cry in the media. But if we reflect further, we realize that behind this view is the liberals' conceit that only they have ideas. The sentiments put forth by Reagan, Bush, Crane, and others may be banal, they may be largely invalid, but they are ideas nevertheless. I may not like your ideas, but I should at least accord them the dignity of being ideas, however misguided.

The "man of courage" line is even more bizarre. John Anderson began the campaign as an unknown centrist in a sea of far better known conservatives. How could he get any votes? He was unknown even in his home state. His only plausible course was to distinguish himself sharply from his competitors: in the jargon of economists, to "differentiate his product." But that could mean only going left in a dramatic manner. The "man of principle," after leading the pro-nuclear energy forces in Congress, suddenly assured his new found liberal allies that he is strongly opposed to nukes. While the public yearns for lower taxes and a balanced budget, Anderson wows the establishment media by coming out for higher taxes—only two years after favoring the 30 percent Kemp-Roth tax cut.

Citing Anderson's courage in coming out for "unpopular" positions—such as supporting ERA, abortion, and a fifty-cents-a-gallon gasoline tax—ignores the fact that these stances are the reverse of unpopular with the liberal media and the supporters that Anderson was trying desperately—and successfully—to attract. The huzzahs for Anderson's much-vaunted courage in supporting gun control before a New Hampshire progun group, for example, ignore the vital point that the meeting was widely televised, and that Anderson was braving the boos on the spot in order to woo a far broader constituency.

Even his allegedly high courage in coming out in favor of a grain embargo in Iowa (where he was not in the running) puts his supposed devotion to peace in grave question. For, after all, the grain embargo was a significant step toward a warlike stance against the Soviets. Anderson's support for a grain embargo seems more important than his much-publicized *mea culpa* for voting for Lyndon Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Being for peace now is a bit more significant than retrospectively coming out for peace more than a decade in the past.

And how much of an anti-Cold War candidate is John Anderson right now? Anderson has joined Jerry Brown and Teddy Kennedy in clambering aboard the 1980 antidraft bandwagon, but is he any more sincere than they in opposing draft registration? In 1971, he supported Nixon's call for a two-year extension of the draft, voted against extending authority for the draft for only one year instead of two, and voted against repealing authority for the draft altogether. Anderson voted for the neutron bomb and the B-1 bomber. Perhaps these recent votes preceded Anderson's miraculous conversion to liberalism. Yet John Anderson denounced Jimmy Carter for "ignominiously backing down" before the Russians during the phony fracas over the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

And in a *Village Voice* interview during the 1980 campaign, Anderson delivered himself of the following pronouncements: He defended the U.S. decision to introduce theater nuclear weapons into Western Europe—this to maintain our "credibility" with NATO; he supported a strong U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf, as well as in the Arabian Sea and the northern Indian Ocean; he came out for increased military aid to the dictatorial regime of General Zia in Pakistan; he declared that the Soviets had to be warned not to "sever the oil" flow from the Persian Gulf to the United States; and he supported Carter's boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. When closely examined, John Anderson's "anti-Cold War" views do not look so very different from Jimmy Carter's.

For a self-proclaimed man of principle, John Anderson has changed his principles with bewildering speed. In addition to his rapid shifts on taxes and nuclear power, consider what transpired on March 7 in Illinois, when Anderson suggested specific budget cuts. Less than an hour later, he backtracked on his proposed reduction in spending for the Consumer Cooperative Bank and in grants for low-income families to pay for heating oil. It did not take long for the man of principle to buckle under pressure.

Joe Conason and Jack Newfield summed it all up in the *Village Voice*: "John Anderson is just a centrist politician who has fooled a lot of influential people with his unorthodox campaign persona and public personality. But . . . he is much more of a hoax than a hope."

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The final irony of the liberals' pursuit of the Impossible Dream of John Anderson is that it probably contributed unwittingly to Gerald Ford's decision not to enter the Republican race, and thereby removed the only man who might have been able to stop Ronald Reagan.

Blaming the consumer

No credit where credit is due

IN MID-MARCH, PRESIDENT CARTER imposed "limited" credit controls, using his authority under the Credit Control Act of 1969—a law that grants the President virtually dictatorial powers over any and every interest rate and other credit mechanism in the country. And the implication is clear that if the economic picture doesn't improve, Carter will slap down even tougher limits on credit.

Credit controls have been a familiar (if counterproductive) expedient in wartime. During World War I, a government committee reviewed all large new offerings of stocks and bonds to determine whether they were in the national interest. Roughly one-quarter of the offerings reviewed were vetoed.

Then, during World War II, the Federal Reserve announced Regulation W, which set minimum down-payments and maximum loan repayments for forty-seven categories of consumer goods. Further decrees set a ninety-day maximum repayment schedule for single payment loans and an even tougher repayment schedule on charge balances—which had to be repaid by the tenth day of the second month after purchase. These and other wartime controls drove ten percent of the GNP into the black market—and produced the waste and crime that always occur when government forces citizens into the black market to satisfy their needs.

Regulation W was pressed into service again during the Korean War and the inflation that was used to finance it. But this time the regulators found the public much less willing to comply than during World War II.

Peacetime credit controls would undoubtedly be even less popular with those hurt by them, and we can expect extensive evasion of Carter's new controls by business and consumers.

Under Carter's plan the Fed requires all credit card and credit check lenders to place 15 percent of all new credit (after March 14) in a non–interest bearing account at the nearest Federal Reserve Bank—along with requiring all money market funds to deposit a similar percentage of their new assets in a similar account.

And here is how this works. If a bank credit card holder purchases something for a hundred dollars, the card issuer must then place fifteen dollars in a non–interest bearing account and leave it there until the consumer pays for the item in full (or until prompt repayments by others reduce the issuer's total credit outstanding to what it was at a given base date).

Almost assuredly the crimp on credit card companies will have the intended effect of making consumer credit harder to obtain, causing cancellations of many accounts that are high credit risks and raising charges on credit for everyone else—both on annual fees and on monthly repayments.

But to blame consumer debt for inflation and the depreciation of the dollar, as Carter did in his March 14 speech, is simply wrong. When a consumer incurs a debt, he must pay it back with the money that he earns. No new money is created. When the government incurs a debt, it can create money out of thin air to repay it. No other entity has that power.

More publicized even than the President's imposition of credit controls was his born-again effort to balance the budget for fiscal year 1981, which begins this October 1. When the White House's original runaway budget was announced in January, American financial markets, particularly the bond market, took one look at it and simply collapsed. Then the President withdrew that budget and promised a new one. On March 14, he announced a $13.5 billion spending cut (the specifics of which had not been announced as of this writing) which, he said, would put the fiscal 1981 budget in balance.

This new "crisis" budget is no such thing. Let's look at the government's own figures. In January the budgeted expenditures for fiscal 1980 and 1981 were $564 billion and $616 billion respectively, for a total two-year expenditure of $1.18 trillion. Now, during the seven weeks between that original budget and the "new" March 14 budget, Washington "revised" the spending estimates for the two years, increasing them by $6 billion and $9.5 billion respectively. The "cuts" announced in March (which still have to be approved by Congress) are $2 billion for 1980 and $13.5 billion for 1981. The new total spending figures—plus revisions and minus cuts—are thus $568 billion for 1980 (up $4 billion from January) and $612 billion for 1981 (down $4 billion from January). This adds up to $1.18 trillion—precisely the same as January's total. This is budget cutting?

Carter has made up the deficit not by spending cuts, but by enormous tax increases. In the seven weeks between the two budgets, the government's take rose $32.5 billion because of revisions in estimated revenue and new taxes on interest and dividends and on imported oil. Added to this are the large tax boosts already proposed in January; financial analyst Erich Heinemann estimates that the tax hike next year will be the biggest in U.S. peacetime history.

Moreover, to say the budget is in balance (even with these massive tax increases) ignores the billions of dollars the government spends on off-budget activities. Foremost among these is federal credit assistance in the form of either direct loans or loan guarantees. Both of these have been running wild in recent years. According to the March 18 *Wall Street Journal*: "New direct loans by off-budget entities such as the Federal Financing Bank grew 70 percent between 1976 and 1979—twice the rate of growth in federal spending—and loan guarantees increased by 108 percent." If one adds up all expenditures currently committed, one finds that, even if Congress and Carter succeed in balancing what goes into the budget in 1981, there will still be a massive $60.7 billion deficit for that year.

One of the probable consequences of Carter's program is that the U.S. Treasury will be in the credit markets, borrowing to make up the large shortfall. Even more will be borrowed if a recession throws the revenue side of the budget out of kilter. This will drive up interest rates, make less credit available to consumers, and increase the calls for even tougher credit controls—not on the government but on the hapless American consumer. And as we have seen, the Credit Control Act of 1969 is sitting there just waiting to be used by any President who sees political advantage in Draconian measures.

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NAT HENTOFF

Nader's nadir

RALPH DE TOLEDANO writes a column that is regularly syndicated by the Copley News Service. In January 1975, he did a piece attacking opponents of nuclear power, including Ralph Nader. A journalist since 1938, with experience ranging from *Newsweek* to King Features, de Toledano is a vehement conservative who, not unlike Nader on the other side, is congenitally on the attack. In all these years, however, de Toledano has been sued for libel only twice—once in 1942, and the second time as a result of that 1975 column.

De Toledano's assault on the antinuclear forces focused on Nader and noted that "In this endeavor, Nader is being aided and abetted by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., who not too long ago devoted some 250 devastating columns of the Congressional Record to demonstrat[ing] conclusively that Nader falsified and distorted evidence to make his case against the automobile [the General Motors Corvair]."

Nader thereupon filed a libel action against de Toledano and the Copley News Service for $5,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The case has not yet gone to trial, but it soon will, because in February 1980 the Supreme Court refused to review a court of appeals decision that denied de Toledano summary judgment on First Amendment grounds. A lower court had thrown out the case under the free press standards of *New York Times* v. *Sullivan* and its progeny (more of which below), but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that de Toledano *does* have to stand trial for libel.

As a dissenting court of appeals judge has emphasized, this decision, left standing by the High Court, "could drop an ice curtain around the exercise of journalistic freedom in interpreting congressional and similar government reports. It is particularly distressing to me that such a precedent is being set in the public information center of the United States, as the nation's capital is the origin of a myriad of such reports."

Nader v. *de Toledano* is clearly an important case, but little has been written about it in the press and none of the established reporters', editors', or publishers' organizations have come to de Toledano's aid. He has been left twisting in the wind because his fiercely conservative views are distasteful to most of his colleagues and because Nader is generally regarded as the apotheosis of crusading virtue. As a prominent First Amendment lawyer told me recently, "Nader has been given a free ride on this one, and that's stupid of the press because the way the case has already developed can be greatly injurious to everyone engaged in commenting on public issues."

Whether or not Nader himself ever collects any of that one million dollars in punitive damages, de Toledano has already been harshly punished for one paragraph. Having had to spend $25,000 on legal costs so far, he is now living on savings. And his right to free expression, when it comes to one public figure at least, is gone: Copley News Service is so fearful of more trouble that when in his column de Toledano simply quoted Nader—without any comment—that column was killed.

THE DOCUMENT THAT HAS been de Toledano's undoing was published in the *Congressional Record* of March 27 and 28, 1973. A staff report of the Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization (chaired by Ribicoff) that filled more than eighty pages of the *Record*, it was an answer to Nader's charges that at a 1966 congressional hearing, witnesses for General Motors had misled the subcommittee concerning the safety of the Corvair. After two and a half years of extensive research on those charges, the subcommittee staff concluded that Nader had not made his case and "hence there is no basis for reopening the hearings for further testimony on the stability and handling of the Corvair."

De Toledano had read the entire report a number of times, using it as part of the documentation for his 1975 book, *Hit and Run, The Rise and Fall of Ralph Nader*. Did the report, as he charged in his column syndicated by Copley, actually "demonstrate conclusively" that Nader "falsified and distorted evidence"? That is an interpretation which—as two judges along the route so far have said —is protected by the First Amendment. The interpretation may be mistaken, but it is not proof of "actual malice" against so public a figure as Ralph Nader. Or, in the language of Stanley S. Harris, the dissenter on the court of appeals, "de Toledano's interpretation of the whole of the staff report . . . should be protected and privileged as a rationally defensible choice among a range of interpretative alternatives."

Such an interpretation should be all the more protected when it is made in commenting on a public figure who then sues for libel. In *New York Times* v. *Sullivan* (1964) the Supreme Court held that in discussing public officials—it later added public figures—a higher standard of proof is required to win libel cases, in order to fulfill the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on political issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks."

Accordingly, a public official or public figure can prevail in a libel suit only if he can prove "actual malice" on the part of the defendants. That is, the writer and/or publisher must be shown to have printed the material "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

How can Nader prove that de Toledano acted with "actual malice"? Well, Nader points out, the introduction to that Ribicoff subcommittee report stated, "Although we have not upheld Mr. Nader's charges against the Corvair and General Motors, we believe they were made in good faith based on the information available to him."

Having ignored that ascription to Nader of "good faith," de Toledano presumably must be guilty of "actual malice." In rebuttal, however, a reasonable person might read that long government report without becoming persuaded of Nader's "good faith." The reader is not bound to agree with the staff, for they too are only making an interpretation of the

NAT HENTOFF writes a monthly column on civil liberties for INQUIRY. His book, The First Freedom: A Tumultuous History of Free Speech in America, *has just been published by Delacorte.*

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evidence—one "among a range of interpretative alternatives." Second, there may have been reasons for the polite bow to Nader at the beginning that are extraneous to what the report actually says. The majority of the subcommittee may not have wanted to unduly antagonize Nader—and his political constituency. As the judge who initially dismissed the suit in the District of Columbia Superior Court said: "The court's reading of the Congressional Record suggests that the single passage regarding the plaintiff's 'good faith' was more of a sugar coating for a bitter pill than an accurate reflection of the content of the report."

He could easily have taken on de Toledano in public debate. But Nader went to court instead.

Yet, the judge continued, that "good faith" pat on Nader's back was the *only* evidence presented by Nader to support his claim that de Toledano had engaged in "actual malice." Accordingly, the judge exercised his right of summary judgment. Under *New York Times* v. *Sullivan* and other precedents, he decided there was no need for the case to go to the jury because Nader had failed "to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice as to either de Toledano" or Copley News Service.

*NADER PRESSED ON, HOW*ever, and the court of appeals, while affirming the acquittal of Copley News Service, reversed the summary judgment insofar as de Toledano was concerned. Why? Because the question of whether that introductory tribute to Nader's "good faith" is sufficient to find de Toledano guilty should be decided by a jury—not by a judge. And so the columnist will somehow have to find thousands upon thousands more dollars with which to defend himself—and the First Amendment.

It should be noted that other characterizations of Nader by the subcommittee staff before the report was published were available to the judges of the court of appeals. On March 12, 1973, Nader wrote a blistering letter to Ribicoff charging that General Motors had had "highly preferential treatment" in the staff inquiry, among other irregularities in the investigation. On the same day, the staff replied in a memorandum that said of several Nader assertions: "This is simply not true . . . This is also not true . . . Exactly the opposite is true."

At the very least, this memorandum, which had also been read by de Toledano, might have given him reason to question the sincerity, and indeed the believability, of the "good faith" tribute to Nader in the introduction to the entire report that appeared a few weeks later.

While *Nader* v. *de Toledano* is of compelling interest for what it reveals of one journalist's First Amendment ordeal—because of something he had written in the justifiable belief that it was protected—this case is also ominous for the rest of the press. Until now, summary judgments in favor of journalists and publications have been quite common in libel cases brought by public figures and public officials. In *Washington Post Co.* v. *Keogh* (1966), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized: "In the First Amendment area, summary judgment procedures are even more essential, for the stake here, if harassment succeeds, is free debate. . . . The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public official [or public figure] may be as chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself, especially to advocates of unpopular causes . . . unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to exercise their First Amendment rights, are assured freedom from the harassment, they will tend to become self-censors."

That is, unless a public official or public figure suing for libel can show with "convincing clarity" that a defendant committed the alleged defamation knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not, a judge, on First Amendment grounds, ought to throw out the case then and there. Victor Kovner, a libel expert whose clients include the *Village Voice*, points out: "The expenses begin at the very early stages of litigation. Discovery proceedings are time-consuming, costly, and often subject a reporter to various levels of intimidation. While these costs always have had a deterring effect, the costs —and hence the chill—are greatly enhanced when the claim is not dismissed by a motion for summary judgment and the publisher has to bear the expense of a trial."

Or, in this case, when the lonely polemicist has to bear the expense of a trial against a powerful muckraker.

IN JUNE 1978, CHIEF JUSTICE Burger inserted a footnote in his majority opinion in *Hutchinson* v. *Proxmire*—the now notorious "footnote 9"—which struck no little terror into the hearts and minds of libel lawyers and those journalists who were paying attention. Grumbling about the fact that there had been so many summary judgments in libel cases, Burger said: "We are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called 'rule' [of summary judgment]. The proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question . . . and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition."

The fear was that this new minefield would cause lower courts to exercise great caution in granting summary judgments on First Amendment grounds. And sure enough, in the court of appeals decision ordering de Toledano to trial, footnote 9 has moved up to the main text. With the Supreme Court declining to review that decision, it is fair to assume that footnote 9—rather than summary judgment—*is* becoming the rule.

If this is so, there will be more libel cases filed, more trials for libel, and much more expense for the defendants. The resultant self-censorship is likely to greatly dilute the Supreme Court's ringing statement in *Garrison* v. *Louisiana* (1964): "Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Or in *Time, Inc.* v. *Hill* (1967): The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press is "not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us, [for a] broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society."

Provided that the journalist can afford a lawyer to keep him free.

What makes this case particularly bizarre, is that the nation's most renowned consumer advocate, a paladin continually demanding that corporations and government open their files to the light of public scrutiny, is striving mightily to punish one lone journalist for subjecting him to scrutiny.

Nader is the very definition of a public figure. That was the sole uncontested

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issue in this case. And, as the Supreme Court said in *Gertz* v. *Robert Welch* (1974), one of the reasons it should be much harder for a public figure to win a libel suit is that he has "significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication" and so has many "available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation."

In terms of available forums, de Toledano would have been no match for Nader had the latter decided to pulverize that one offending paragraph at every public opportunity. Instead, Nader took the journalist to court. In the court record I have seen, Nader has not shown that he has suffered any monetary damage, any anguish, or any damage to his reputation from the de Toledano column. On the other hand, he has certainly had his revenge—long before the case goes to trial. But what did Nader have against the First Amendment that *it* should be his victim too?

At the end of his dissenting opinion, Judge Harris put the whole case in clear perspective: "The statement written by appellee de Toledano by which appellant Nader feels aggrieved may not be a model of clinical objectivity in reporting. However, it is virtually universally recognized that little in contemporary journalism is wholly free of some predisposition on the part of its author. That fact does not make what arguably may even be perceived as a gross inaccuracy actionable. Appellant Nader functions by choice in the public eye. He, as well as others across the full range of the political and philosophical spectrum, must accept certain inevitable consequences of so functioning."

If you can't take the heat, don't go running to court.

Harris ends by quoting from a 1977 decision (*Edwards* v. *National Audubon Society*) by Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:

"We believe that the interest of a public figure in the purity of his reputation cannot be allowed to obstruct that vital pulse of ideas and intelligence on which an informed and self-governing people depend. It is unfortunate that the exercise of liberties so precious as freedom of speech and of the press may sometimes do harm that the state is powerless to recompense: but this is the price that must be paid for the blessings of a democratic way of life."

Of all people, a *consumer advocate* ought to realize that this is not too high a price to pay for freedom of speech and of the press. ❑



PAUL ANDERSON & GLENN GARVIN

Institutional insanity

WHEN SCOTT WAS 14, the doctors put him in a tiny cell, six feet by eight. (In mental hospitals, though, there is no such thing as a cell; Scott was in a "quiet room.") There was no furniture, not even a mattress, so he slept on the concrete floor. The walls were bare. Most of the time Scott was naked; his only possession was a green blanket.

Scott, who was deaf and retarded, hadn't hurt anybody or committed any crime. But the doctors had somehow concluded that he was a "paranoid schizophrenic" (sometimes he ran away from home) and so they locked him up. After a few years in the cell, Scott began expressing his opinion of the place by smearing his feces (in mental hospitals there is no such thing as shit) over the walls. Confirms our worst fears, the doctors agreed. Pump him full of drugs; he might be dangerous. For ten years he stayed there, slumped in a corner, too dazed by Thorazine to move around, rarely able to do much more than shove some feces against the wall.

In 1979, when Scott was 24, a public defender heard about him and began raising holy hell. Beg pardon, said the doctors, and they let this pathetic human being, half his young life irretrievably wasted and the rest perhaps irredeemably blighted, out of his cage. Some social workers are now trying to repair the damage of a decade.

When Scott's story appeared in the Miami newspapers last summer, it shocked the daylights out of people all over Florida's Gold Coast. But it did not even raise an eyebrow inside South Florida State Hospital, site of Scott's ten-year confinement. There are many Scotts at South Florida State, and many worse tales to tell. The tales are unfolding now before a grand jury, and perhaps when they are through some people from this vile, filthy institution that makes a mockery of the word "hospital" will go to jail.

South Florida State is located in the little suburban town of Pembroke Pines, right between Miami and Fort Lauderdale. It houses some 1100 mental patients, about half of them involuntarily commited. And in a field never noted for its humanity, South Florida State is the very worst. "The place is an absolute snakepit," says an investigator for the state attorney's local staff. "I wouldn't put a dog in there." The people who work at the hospital won't defend it. "You remember the movie *One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest?*" an aide says. "This is a lot like that movie."

Inside South Florida State patients are sexually abused by the staff. They are beaten, sometimes by the aides and sometimes by other patients for the aides' amusement. They are drugged ceaselessly. Their food is inedible; the state budgets $1.76 per patient per day for meals. Staff members will sometimes bring in something edible from the outside world and charge an extortionate sum. The patients are systematically tortured in small ways that over the years send them to the very brink. And if they complain they get sent to the quiet rooms, the tiny cells where Scott spent ten years.

Patients were beaten regularly with mop handles and high-heeled shoes.

The hospital has been investigated so much since it opened in 1957 that sometimes it seemed that the grand jury ought to open an office on the grounds. But the newest probe is the longest—it's

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been going on nearly a year now—and has produced the most information about what actually goes on inside the hospital. It is also the first ever to really capture the public's attention.

IT STARTED IN MARCH 1979 when Norma Perdue, a 44-year-old grandmother, decided she couldn't take it any more. Perdue had been working as an aide at the hospital for seven months, and even though she was accustomed to seaminess—Perdue had worked for many years in mental hospitals in West Virginia and Kentucky—she was astonished and sickened by what went on at South Florida State.

Every time Perdue started her shift she found patients who hadn't been treated for medical problems, patients who had been improperly drugged, and patients covered with black-and-blue marks that always seemed to have resulted from "a fall in the shower." Complaints to her superiors on the staff got no results.

"There was one woman who was kept in a quiet room for over a week, and she was really sick," Perdue recalls. "She kept throwing up on herself, and had diarrhea. I think it was just the old-fashioned flu. But they wouldn't ever bring a doctor to see her. She was such a mess we had to change her room every two hours at night, but on the day shift they did nothing for her." But soon Perdue realized that the old woman in the quiet room was the least of her problems. Other staff members had been encouraging racial animosity among the patients, some of whom were being beaten regularly with broomsticks, mop handles and high-heeled shoes; and there were even rumors of sexual exploitation of patients by aides, rumors so sleazy Perdue was reluctant to give them credence.

Finally she began keeping detailed notes of everything she saw, and in March sent a detailed seventeen-page letter to Florida Governor Bob Graham, complete with names and dates. That pebble in the bureaucratic pond started a series of ripples that eventually floated in a team of investigators from the state's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). The HRS men quickly realized that the abuses at South Florida State were really violations of criminal law, and they turned their work over to the state attorney.

Between August and November the humid coastal air fairly buzzed with new disclosures about South Florida State. What with the state attorney, the grand jury, a local circuit judge who launched a judicial inquiry into the hospital, and some topnotch investigative reporting by the *Miami Herald*, the litany of monstrous abuse was endless.

Most eye-catching were the stories of sexual misbehavior by the staff, from the lowest psychiatric aide to the very uppermost echelons of administration. Higher ranking staff preyed on lower ranking staff, and lower ranking staff preyed on the patients they were supposed to be treating. Many employees admitted that the quiet rooms made splendid trysting places in addition to their other uses. The grand jury heard testimony that when a security guard was caught engaging in sexual intercourse with a patient, the patient's psychiatrist said that "it was good therapy . . . the patient must be getting better." The sexual abuse was both heterosexual and homosexual, and a clique of homosexual doctors and administrators was accused of making homosexual activity the price of advancement in one part of the hospital. Three of them subsequently resigned.

When one of the guards had sex with a patient, a psychiatrist said it was "good therapy."

Sometimes the payoff to patients in return for sex was alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine. (In one area the patients rioted and seized a ward after getting drunk on scotch smuggled in by an aide.) For those patients not "lucky" enough to be considered desirable sexual prey, favors—like decent food—could always be purchased from a cooperative staff member. A takeout Chinese dinner that cost $2.95 at a nearby restaurant cost a patient $5.00; hoagies that sold for $2.00 outside went for $6.00 inside; a bottle of liquor cost $15 inside the hospital.

*THERE WERE MORE HOR-*ror stories out of the quiet rooms, too. Relatives of a 72-year-old woman visited her at the hospital, only to find her lying in her own feces in a quiet room, dehydrated and nearly dead. She also had a compound fracture of the hip, which no one could ever explain. Grand jurors later learned that the woman had been unattended in the room for three days.

The stories went on and on. One aide bit off part of a patient's ear during a struggle. On another occasion security guards held a patient's arms while an aide beat him up. The grand jury concluded that sometimes staff members urged patients to attack other patients, and at the very best, staff members pursued a course of benign neglect when patients abused one another. "Often when patients are fighting," a grand jury report said, "the aides will make no attempt to stop it, and their attitude is, as long as the patients aren't fighting them, who cares?"

But in a mental hospital there is no need to beat up a recalcitrant patient. The staff exercises a total, omnipotent control over every aspect of the patients' lives. The patient who talks back can be exiled to the quiet room, shot so full of Thorazine he can't lift his head. He can be harassed in more subtle ways: An aide can walk into the locked nurses' station and smoke an entire pack of Marlboros, one by one, in full view of a patient. For the patient who can't afford cigarettes, or—more likely—isn't allowed to have them, that sight will be an exquisite torture. Watching television inside the nurses' station while patients plead for their mail or other personal effects is another favorite pastime. In one ward a patient who complained that there was no toilet paper was told to use her fingers; in another, where there were no sanitary napkins, the patients were told to wad up toilet paper and use that.

Nowhere are the patterns of abuse more clear than in the hospital's forensic, or court-hold, area. Here 140 accused criminals are confined. Some of them have been found not guilty by reason of insanity; others are awaiting a psychiatric evaluation before going to trial.

Even the most liberal doctor on the hospital's staff concedes that something on the order of half the patients in the forensic unit are faking their symptoms and are really guilty of the crimes with which they are charged. (Some people at the hospital think as many as 80 percent are fakers.)

But even though the forensic area of the hospital is functioning, in effect, as a

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jail, its security force seems blissfully oblivious. Visitors are subjected to almost no scrutiny—only a primitive, hand-held metal detector that doesn't pick up a gun or knife that's been wrapped in a plastic sandwich bag. (Escapes became so common that the hospital finally imported guards from the state prisons to patrol the fences.) Weapons are easily obtained in the forensic area (last summer a patient pulled a gun on a doctor, kidnapped a nurse, and escaped) and many of the patients there exist in a permanent state of terror. Aides say there's good reason for them to be afraid; unreported attacks by one patient on another are common.

"It happens all the time," said one worker. "I see patients with bruises all over their faces, and they say they walked into a door. Or they slipped on a bar of soap when there was no soap around. They're afraid to talk about it."

THE PATIENT WHO DOES talk soon wishes he hadn't. A 19-year-old man who reported two sexual assaults by another patient last September learned to his chagrin that the hospital staff had no intention of notifying the local police. Instead, staff members:

—locked the *victim* in a quiet room for twenty-two hours;

—arranged a confrontation between the victim and his assailant, even though the assailant had threatened to kill the victim if the sexual assaults were reported; and

—transferred the victim into a maximum-security punishment ward where he would be confined with the most violent and dangerous people in the hospital.

Later, when the *Miami Herald* confronted hospital officials with the incident, they dismissed the entire episode and claimed that the victim of the assaults was a troublemaker who recently had "become violent."

The victim himself confirmed that: After he was confined to the maximum security unit he broke some windows. "I couldn't understand what was happening to me," he told reporters. "The other guy was getting the better deal. *He* raped *me* and I was the one who was getting punished."

The furor raised by the investigation at South Florida State has already cost several of the hospital's top officials their jobs, and others have quietly moved on to greener pastures before their names could be dragged into the growing scandal. Even the state officials who oversee Florida's mental hospitals are calling for indictments. "That's what it's going to take to stop the lethargy that exists at the hospital," says Charles Daly, an HRS administrator.

The tragic truth that the officials are reluctant to acknowledge is that even if the obvious, flagrant abuses are stopped, the patients at South Florida State will be little better off. The high caseloads mean that a patient is extraordinarily lucky to see a psychiatrist for ten minutes every week—but even then he is unlikely to be able to communicate with the doctor. About 80 percent of the hospital's psychiatrists are foreign-born and -educated, and many of them speak little English. Often even the hospital's English-speaking administrators can't understand what the doctors are saying.

At the very bottom of the mess is the fact that the staff can't even reach a working agreement on what "mental illness" is, much less how to treat it, which is why uncommunicative patients like Scott get diagnosed as hopelessly ill and are locked up. "Schizophrenia is a wastebasket term," says one contemptuous administrator. "Anything a doctor can't understand, or anything that seems strange, gets lumped under schizophrenia. You couldn't get any two doctors in this hospital to agree on what it means or what the symptoms are."

The staff can't even agree on what 'mental illness' is, much less how it should be treated.

Many of the doctors admit it. They say economics as much as anything else influences who winds up inside their wards. "Rich people get called eccentric," says Dr. Vidal Lopez, the hospital's former clinical director. "Nobody calls them crazy. You can buy shirts and throw them away after wearing them once when you're rich. If you're poor and you do that you'll be naked. And they'll take you away." Adds Dr. James Diodato, formerly a staff psychiatrist: "A lot of my patients are people who, if they lived next door to me, I would call eccentric. They don't need to be here. But society calls them crazy. So here they are."

The doctors' doubts about the fine line between sanity and insanity seem to have infected the rest of the hospital too. On two different occasions patients have found their way to the hospital's employment office, applied for jobs as security guards, and been hired. One of them worked for a month before he was detected.

And so it continues. Recent inspections of the hospital showed that its fire alarm wasn't even hooked up, and in three places raw sewage was spilling out of the waste disposal system and onto the ground. Other inspections have found such filth, decay, and structural damage that state officials are giving serious thought to tearing down the seventy-eight buildings and reconstructing the entire place from the ground up, a thought that undoubtedly fills Scott and the hospital's other victims with unrestrained glee.

But there is no glee for the people who are trying to salvage something out of this mess. Six months ago Robert Burton was a respected administrator at Miami's Jackson Memorial Hospital. Now, as South Florida State's top administrator, he spends his days coping with whatever latest disaster report has come to his desk. He is beginning to doubt the chances for success. "Frankly, if someone had told me what I'd really find here," said Burton, after the latest of an endless series of court appearances, "I'd have doubted their sanity." ❑

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

STEPHEN TALBOT

The case of the mysterious flash

WAS IT A SUPER LIGHTning bolt? A cosmic ray? A meteor? Or was it a secret nuclear test conducted by South Africa, Israel, or both, which Washington, Pretoria, and Tel Aviv are trying to cover up? The "mystery flash" recorded by a U.S. Vela spy satellite somewhere over the vast South Atlantic–Indian Ocean region at 3 A.M. (South Africa time) on September 22, 1979, has sparked a heated behind-the-scenes debate within the Carter administration.

Already the administration has been embarrassed by the obvious inadequacies of the nation's nuclear detection satellite system. Worried that this weakness in monitoring the Southern Hemisphere will hurt the case for SALT during the verification debate, officials painstakingly reassure questioners that U.S. surveillance of the Soviet Union is far more comprehensive and accurate.

Confirmation that Israel and South Africa had joined the nuclear club would also stagger President Carter's nonproliferation campaign, mocking his effort to coax Pretoria into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ("Carter's Nuclear Deal with South Africa," Oct. 30, 1978). A perilous new factor would be introduced into the volcanic politics of the Middle East and southern Africa. The danger of nuclear war would increase considerably.

"It would be a major turning point in our relations with South Africa and Israel if we determined conclusively that either had tested a nuclear bomb," a State Department official acknowledged with a shudder. "It makes me terribly nervous just to think about it."

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IT WAS MORE THAN A MONTH after the Vela registered what appeared to be the distinctive twin flash of a nuclear blast that someone leaked the story to ABC's John Scali. Pretoria denied the report as "complete nonsense." When asked by ABC to comment, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said, "The development of nuclear weapons by South Africa, of course, would be a destabilizing and a dangerous step forward." Press aides at the Pentagon, State Department, Department of Energy, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency do not stray from the White House line: The investigation into the September 22 incident is continuing and so far there has been no solid evidence confirming that a nuclear explosion took place. Washington does not want to jeopardize its current strategy of gently encouraging the South African regime to reform its apartheid policies and continuing the protracted negotiations over the independence of Namibia, the uranium-rich territory still ruled by Pretoria.

Similarly, the administration, already embroiled in a bitter and embarrassing dispute with the Begin government over Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territory, had no desire to make a public issue out of the February 21 CBS report that Israel had exploded a nuclear bomb last September off the coast of South Africa "with the help and cooperation of the South African government"—especially after Israel denied the allegation. The State Department, despite longstanding CIA reports that Israel has developed a small nuclear arsenal, reminded reporters that Israel had pledged not to be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and said there was "no corroborative evidence" that Israel had conducted a nuclear test.

Administration reticence about the one-second, intense double pulse of light recorded by Vela is matched by a wary silence in Congress, although the CIA has told select members of the Senate and House privately that it strongly suspects the September 22 event was a nuclear explosion and that South Africa and Israel are the most likely culprits. No congressional hearings are planned. "These are delicate allegations," cautioned Representative Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.), explaining why his House Foreign Affairs Committee will steer clear of the subject and defer to the White House investigation.

When the story of the possible nuclear blast first broke, Representative Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House subcommittee on Africa and an ardent foe of the apartheid regime, called the reports "extremely serious and deeply disturbing." He promised to hold hearings the following week, but Solarz never convened those hearings. Members of his staff say that he will conduct hearings in April or May on U.S.–South African relations, but they do not expect the nuclear issue to be covered.

In November Dr. Frank Press, the President's science adviser, convened a panel of nine scientists, chaired by Professor Jack Ruina of MIT, to study the incident. Their report concluding that the source of the mysterious double flash was "technically indeterminate" was to have been released in January. But it wasn't, and the group will reconvene in April. The White House decision to continue the probe may well have been prompted by the mounting evidence leaked to the press that a nuclear explosion, rather than some freak natural phenomenon was what registered on the satellite's sensors.

The *Washington Post*—the only major American newspaper to pursue the story of the nuclear mystery—reported in January: "The technical experts at places like the Department of Energy and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico need no convincing. They fully believe that somebody triggered a small atomic explosion" and "question why there should be such equivocating" by the administration.

EXPLANATIONS FOR THE twin flash range from the self-serving and outlandish to the plausible. Dismissing reports that his country might have exploded a nuclear weapon, South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha derisively suggested that the United States "ask Father Neptune what is going on in his kingdom." Presumably in a more serious vein, the commander of the South African navy, Vice Admiral J. C. Walters, suggested that an accident aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine sailing off the Cape of Good Hope could have caused the reported blast. U.S. officials quickly responded that no Soviet subs were believed to be in the area on September 22, and that a submarine reactor accident at the worst would cause a meltdown and not an explosion of the sort Vela spotted.

Searching for a nonnuclear alternative, U.S. officials suggested initially that the satellite might have malfunctioned. But it was learned that the Vela satellite had flawlessly detected nuclear

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explosions before, had been calibrated just the week prior to the registered blast, and responded appropriately to test signals after September 22. Next, the administration offered a wide selection of natural phenomena as possible causes: solar flares, cosmic rays, super lightning bolts. However, it has been disclosed that the nine scientists have now ruled out all but one possible natural cause: the remote chance that a small meteoroid or other piece of space debris caused a double glint of sunlight to register on the satellite's "bangmeters," imprinting the exact replica of a nuclear bomb signature—a burst of light that dims and then explodes in an even more brilliant flash, producing a "double hump" on a logarithmic scale. A computer check confirms the possibility of such an occurrence, according to *Science* magazine. But administration officials concede the probability is "very low." "Outside the government," *Science* reports, "this [meteor] explanation is met with skepticism."

The skepticism is not limited to people outside the government. Although the official State Department position is still noncommittal, an official responsible for southern African affairs acknowledged, "The Vela satellite has been right 41 out of 41 times in identifying nuclear tests. Some people here definitely believe this thing was a bomb."

One important kind of evidence for a nuclear explosion is still missing: There have been no confirmed reports of fallout. In mid-November the Institute of Nuclear Science in Wellington, New Zealand, reported traces of fallout in rainwater samples consistent with the Vela detection of an explosion in the South Atlantic area of a small—two to four kilotons—nuclear device. But other labs disputed the finding, and the fallout report was withdrawn. Failure to detect radiation does not contradict the satellite's report of a blast. Given the vast expanse of the area in question—a circle with a radius of 3500 miles—and the small size of the reported explosion, U.S. monitors simply may have missed the fallout. That has occurred in the past.

Even more alarming is the possibility that the blast may have been a neutron bomb—a low-yield weapon whose fallout doesn't travel far or linger in the atmosphere. "We have no evidence that it was," said a source close to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, "but the possibility has been discussed more than once."

From a military standpoint, it is conceivable that South Africa and Israel might consider using a neutron bomb as a desperate weapon against a tank invasion or a concentration of hostile troops since the bomb is intended for use in close quarters and is designed to minimize damage to nearby towns and property. For example, a South African government might contemplate dropping a neutron bomb on an African "bantustan" or using it to seal a border with Mozambique or Zimbabwe, since use of this kind of nuclear weapon would reduce risk to neighboring white enclaves.

The most intriguing piece of potential corroboration for a nuclear explosion was a chance sighting by a new, sophisticated radio observatory at Arecibo, Puerto Rico. On September 22, Arecibo's radar—the most sensitive in the world—saw a ripple in the ionosphere moving from the southeast. Although this effect can be caused by earthquakes, electrical storms, or other natural events, the evening was reportedly calm, with no unusual weather, and the scientists at Arecibo believe that their sighting could be an important "piece in the puzzle" in checking Vela's account of a nuclear blast. However, in what they described as a tumultuous meeting with the White House panel, the scientists from Puerto Rico were dismayed to see their findings challenged and dismissed. "It surprised me," said Arecibo scientist Lewis Duncan, "that people have tried as much as they have to discredit it."

Perhaps the most alarming possibility is that the blast may have been a neutron bomb.

The CIA has also turned up a compelling bit of information. The agency has told certain members of Congress that a task force of South African warships was conducting a secret exercise at sea the night Vela reported a blast.

IF THERE WAS A NUCLEAR test on September 22, it was conducted stealthily. The explosion would have occurred in a remote area, in the middle of the night, under heavy cloud cover. One of the more alarming suggestions is that whoever may have set off the bomb knew the course and schedule of the Vela satellite. As it turned out, the satellite happened to be out of position the night of September 22—the only reason it managed to record the light flash. "We were lucky," admitted a Pentagon official. "If Vela had been on course we would have missed the whole thing." Some experts fear that this means there might have been other explosions that Vela failed to detect.

Who might have known the whereabouts of Vela? Perhaps Pretoria. The United States and South Africa have shared monitoring facilities and satellite information for years. The highly advanced, top-secret tracking station at Silvermine is plugged into the NATO communications grid, according to South African officials. Until 1974, NASA ran an observatory in South Africa with the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. The South Africans know a great deal about U.S. detection capabilities in the region from such cooperation, and they are always trying to keep their intelligence up to date. The Senate subcommittee on nuclear proliferation recently learned from the National Technical Information Service that the South African defense and naval attaché in Washington had requested a computer search of the literature on nuclear explosions and the seismic detection of nuclear explosions.

An important book largely ignored by the U.S. press, *The Nuclear Axis* (Times Books, New York, 1978) adds another tantalizing piece of information. According to coauthors Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, the United States, in cooperation with South Africa, carried out a series of nuclear tests off the South African coast in 1958. South Africa helped monitor the fallout and became familiar with fallout patterns in the region. Although a number of officials at the White House and in the State Department said they were unaware of these tests (and even expressed doubt that they had occurred), a nuclear affairs authority at the Department of Energy, Jim Cannon, confirmed that these tests took place on August 27, August 30, and September 6, 1958. They were described as "weapons effects tests" and involved small bombs of one or two kilotons each.

Rogers and Cervenka add that in 1967 Martin Walker, a British journalist working for an Afrikaner publisher, discovered that South Africa seemed to be carrying on similar nuclear experiments in the same offshore area, known as the Southern African or Cape Town Anomaly. A British nuclear scientist,

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Pretoria has certainly developed a 'bomb in the basement'—even if it has not yet been tested.

Douglas Torr, was involved, and three South African air force Hastings bombers were apparently being used in the tests. Before he could pursue the story of the possible South African nuclear tests any further, Walker was ordered by his publisher to give up the story.

Confirmation of a South African nuclear test last September would raise disturbing and politically sensitive questions about the U.S. role in helping South Africa to develop its uranium industry and nuclear capability. In 1957, the two nations signed a nuclear cooperation accord that guaranteed South Africa access to valuable information, enriched uranium, and technical aid. The agreement—which made it possible for South Africa to begin nuclear research and development—was renewed in 1974 and extended until the year 2007. In 1976 the head of the South African Atomic Energy Board acknowledged the key U.S. role in South Africa's nuclear development by telling a group of visiting Americans, "We ascribe our degree of advancement today, in large measure, to the training and assistance so willingly provided by the USA during the early years of our nuclear program . . ." Under the pact an American firm, Allis-Chalmers Corporation, built South Africa's first nuclear reactor (Safari I) and provided it with 231 pounds of enriched uranium—enough to make several Hiroshima-size nuclear bombs.

Although the Carter administration is currently withholding further supplies of enriched uranium from South Africa in an effort to convince Pretoria to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the damage may have already been done. The enriched uranium supplied by the United States for Safari I is weapons-grade—although not of the highest quality—and Safari itself is subject to international inspection. However, South Africa's top-secret enrichment plant at Valindaba (a Zulu expression meaning "the talking is over") is off-limits to any international inspection. Valindaba uses an adaptation of the West German "jet-nozzle" enrichment technique, and is believed to be capable of producing high-grade, fissionable material for nuclear bombs. Yet, the U.S. government authorized the Foxboro Corporation of Massachusetts to provide South Africa with two advanced computers to run the unsafeguarded Valindaba facility.

Finally, more than 155 U.S. nuclear experts have participated in South Africa's nuclear development program and 90 nuclear scientists from South Africa have received training in this country; this has not been discontinued by the Carter administration.

WITH TWENTY YEARS OF help from the United States and more recently from other Western countries, Pretoria has certainly developed a "bomb in the basement"—even if it has not been tested. A recent Harvard study stated: "With a highly developed nuclear establishment, including unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facilities, Pretoria could build a bomb any time it wishes."

Like South Africa, Israel has long been suspected of being a "near nuclear" power. In 1974 the CIA reported that Israel had at least ten nuclear weapons. Last October, the *Los Angeles Times* reported from Johannesburg that "South African officials acknowledge that they have been helped in their nuclear research by scientists from Israel. . . . It is neither confirmed nor denied here that South Africa provides uranium to Israel in return for Israel's technical cooperation."

South African–Israeli ties have grown closer since 1976, when then Prime Minister John Vorster visited Israel. A trade boom followed, with the two best-selling items—diamonds and arms—unreported. Although Israel claims to be observing the 1977 UN arms embargo against Pretoria, South Africa has already purchased millions of dollars worth of Uzi submachine guns, anti-guerrilla infiltration systems, gunboats—and the Gabriel missile, capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

"I don't know if the Israelis are observing the arms embargo," confided a State Department official. "But there is definitely a tendency for these two countries to get closer together, although the Israelis don't approve of apartheid. They share many perceptions. They see themselves as besieged, with a view of Armageddon."

CBS reported that an as yet unpublished book by two veteran Israeli journalists says that Pretoria offered Israel a nuclear testing site in or near South Africa as far back as 1966, but that the Israeli government declined. If the report of a joint Israeli–South African test last September is true, it would indicate that the Begin government—and the Botha regime—both so mistrust U.S. intentions that they have decided to develop their own military capacities as far as they can. It would be the kind of reckless, doomsday decision that would be of grave importance to governments and people everywhere.

It may be that the Carter administration honestly does not know whether a nuclear blast occurred in the vicinity of South Africa on September 22, but confirmation of the blast would be a major political embarrassment for the administration—one crisis it may want to avoid. Ronald Walters of Howard University, an expert in the field of South Africa's nuclear development, suspects that the administration is trying to "fuzz" the technical data in order to avoid a confrontation with two troublesome allies.

And it must be remembered that there are some in Washington who may regret an Israeli or South African nuclear test, but basically sympathize with these governments and do not want to cause a rift between them and the United States. A staff member of the House Armed Services Committee who visited South Africa last fall with a congressional delegation reported, "Of course, there are a lot of people on the Hill who would like us to develop closer military ties with Pretoria. The South Africans have an outstanding naval base at Simonstown, and the good Lord in his wisdom chose to put valuable, strategic minerals in southern Africa."

At the moment, the South Africans and the Israelis are enjoying the Carter administration's indecision about the nuclear bomb test reports. The hint that Tel Aviv and Pretoria have tested a nuclear device allows them to saber-rattle, to have a psychological edge over their opponents, without suffering the condemnation that confirmation of a test would bring. As one South African newspaper cartoon boasted, "Who needs the real bomb? Rumors are a cheaper deterrent."

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THE TROUBLE WITH TEDDY

His legislative record is terrible, his politics are opportunistic, the ghost of Chappaquiddick haunts his campaign. Yet still Teddy plagues us.

By NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN

THE ONLY LOSER THE FAMILY HAS brought forth, Teddy is nevertheless the one male Kennedy who seems imperishable. Ballots can't kill him. He lives, constantly dieting toward the slim proportions that have enabled the Kennedy men to woo and wow females, whether registered to vote or not. That Teddy remains in the race, that his candidacy isn't being laughed off, that journalism hasn't consigned him to the graveyard, may not be vampire-ish, but it is at least preternatural.

On its face, this attempt to rush the White House is preposterous. Not since James G. Blaine lost to Grover Cleveland has any major candidate been encapsulated in quite the moral odium that surrounds Edward Kennedy. Blaine's honor, if not his honesty, had been impeached by the widely held belief that, when a member of the House of Representatives, he'd been enriched by the railroad interests. The case against Blaine was never exactly proved; the one against Teddy isn't

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disputed even by his admirers, who react to the odoriferous cloud around their champion by giving you to understand that it is gauche to discuss it.

Take Kennedy's name off the top of his curriculum vitae and what would one say of a candidate whose career résumé included these qualifications: kicked out of college for cheating; a Roman Catholic whose adulteries, it is repeatedly whispered, turned his wife into an alcoholic; the center of a scandalous episode involving the unexplained death of a young woman; accused by the British magazine *Private Eye* of attempting to use drugs to force his unwanted attentions on an American girl in a relatively recent incident in Athens, Greece; dismissed from his post as Democratic majority whip by his colleagues in the Senate because of his inattentiveness and neglect of his duties.

As a member of a body that includes men of the intellectual and moral stature of Herman Talmadge, Harrison Williams, Jacob Javits, and John Warner, with his record Kennedy fits in nicely. As the candidate for the presidency of a profoundly middle-class nation, you would think he would have been disqualified as the Fatty Arbuckle of American politics. (Arbuckle, for those who may not be silent-movie fans, lost his stardom and never worked in the movies again as a consequence of the unexplained death of a girl in a hotel suite fifty-odd years ago.)

BUT WITH THE KENNEDYS, THE ORDINARY laws of political and social cause and effect are suspended. Only close students of *People* magazine or the journalism of Geraldo Rivera can develop the intuition needed to understand why Teddy and his tribe are impervious to what would be a disgrace for you, me, or even Hamilton Jordan. Just as geneticists have designed microbes that feed on oil spills and extrude healthy, useful chemicals, so the Kennedys represent a social evolution which permits them to ingest the scum of scandal and excrete it in the form of enhanced status.

Recall the unorthodox launching of the playboy prince's run for the Rose Garden. After an infinity of interviews in which the handsome baritone said coyly, "I expect President Carter to be renominated and I expect to support him," stories of a different tenor began to appear. A certain Dudley Dudley, described by the *Washington Post*'s David Broder as "a dazzling blonde," was spotted in New Hampshire forming up a crusade to demand that Baby Brother save America from the no-neck crackers. Dudley Dudley, who has since vanished from the mass media retina as quickly as she landed on it, was described as an unreconstructed greenie who heats with wood and lives off of silage—suggesting a marriage of convenience between the old blue-collar Kennedy constituents and the nature lovers at L. L. Bean's and Eddie Bauer's. In any event, we were led to believe that the dazzling blondes of this world had put our rich and somehow eternally young—or perhaps only eternally puerile—senator in an irresistible squeeze (we must watch our figures of speech hereabouts) and that he was being forced to break with the wisdom of his party and the history of the country that says you cannot deprive a sitting President of renomination, no, not even if he's Jerry Ford who wasn't even elected.

You may remember the next news was the leak that Teddums had asked the dowager empress, his mother Rose, if he might have the maternal blessing to follow the path his brothers had taken. Doubtless it was meant to induce a lump in the throat and a tear in the eye, but it came across more like:

"Mama, Mama, kin I run for President, kin I? Kin I, pulleeze?"

"Not till you've had your bath, Teddy dear."

"But Mama, you said I could if I'd wait and take my nap."

"And you did wait, like Mama's good boy, but Teddy sweets, you must have a bath before you declare. We wouldn't want our President to have dirt in his tummy dimples or between his little piggy toes."

There was an astonishing patrician arrogance in the way the Kennedy retinue started off the campaign. You never felt it was his candidacy but theirs—the blood relatives in the immediate clan and the extended one, including the ambitious asps from Harvard, the old-fashioned coat-holders, the society ladies, and the fraternity of well-born, loose-brained youngest brothers. Such fatuous innocence hadn't been seen since representatives of the same social stratum had their coachmen drive them across the Potomac, expecting to watch General McDowell's army destroy the Southerners at the First Battle of Bull Run. In the ensuing rout of the Union army, the spectators almost got themselves killed. This time, though, instead of Stonewall Jackson, the Southerner's name would be Jimmy Carter; he scattered this overconfident and poorly prepared mob in Iowa.

The way the campaign began promised the slaughter that so quickly came to pass. First there was the nasty business with the drug problems of one of his nephews—not to mention the giggly talk about sister-in-law Ethel (the same *Private Eye* magazine published a story alleging she'd been caught shoplifting in Georgetown). The campaign itself had a Bull Run insouciance about it, beginning with the $40,000 redecoration of the Boeing 727 that was to be the Kennedy campaign plane. This is the kind of thing other men—even the megalomaniacal Mr. Nixon—do after they've won the election and can pass the bill on to the taxpayers. To fly the damn plane cost $10,000 a day, and during the Christmas holidays, while Teddy was vacationing in Palm Beach, the plane just sat on the tarmac eating up $5,000 a day. It was that sort of campaigning—at the beginning—with twelve advisers on the payroll, each getting forty-to-fifty grand a year. It's hard to believe that nobody had told them that in politics you make your money after you're elected; before, you live like Jack Sprat. You don't do what brother-in-law and campaign manager Stephen Smith did, which was to spend what would later be so badly wanted in Illinois on such necessities as putting a new window in his office. (The office was in Kennedy's national headquarters—located, appropriately, in what was once a Cadillac dealership.)

Teddy and his tribe are impervious to what would surely be a disgrace for you, me, or even Hamilton Jordan.

The campaign suffered terrible prenatal damage. Roger Mudd reached in and mangled the fetus with that devastating

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special aired on CBS just before the announcement so the network wouldn't have to give Jerry Brown and Jimmy Carter equal amounts of prime time. The competition was showing *Jaws* that night, but apparently a lot of people were more interested in watching Teddy Boy being eaten alive than some unknown girl on a beach. That was the program where he revealed himself as Mr. Articulate when asked if he thought the populace would come to believe the palpable falsehoods of his Chappaquiddick story:

"Oh there's, the problem is, from that night, I, I, found the conduct, the behavior, almost beyond belief myself. I mean that's why its been, but I think that's, that's, that's the way it was. That, that happens to be the way it was. Now I find it as I have stated that I have found that the conduct that in, in that evening and in, in the, as a result of the impact of the accident of the, and the sense of loss, the sense of hope, and, the, and the sense of tragedy, and the whole set of, circumstances, that the, the behavior was inexplicable."

It makes Jimmy Carter sound like Demosthenes. Still and all you can't take away from Teddy that he can, when he's on, give a moving speech. He's got the delivery, and in Ted Sorensen and Dick Goodwin he's got the speech writers, the same gifted craftsmen who did so well by his older brothers. Whatever money it took to teach Teddy how to talk, to equip him with the best words to talk, was spent. That's the difference between him and Carter. Teddy was an indifferent piece of wood who has been planed and sanded and polished and waxed by the best political carpenters obtainable; Jimmy is the self-improvement kid. He may not do it well, whatever it is, but you've got to concede he did it by himself.

An encounter with Teddy in an interview where the topic is one that he isn't yet well-schooled in leaves you wondering whether he isn't just a bit dumb. Perhaps he's merely a slow starter, but the chaotic syntax, the dribbled language, and the impenetrable thickets of unrelated words aren't confined to subjects about which he may feel guilty or nervous. He can mess up most anything that way. You would think, for instance, that Kennedy would have a fairly well articulated rap on the difference between himself and Jimmy Carter. But listen to his reply to such a question: "Well, it's um, you have to grips with the different issues that, ah, that, ah, we're facing, I mean we can, we have to deal with each of the various questions that we're talking about, whether it's a question of the economy, whether it's in the area of energy."

FROM THE START YOU COULD TELL WHO was running, but not why. Lined up beside the candidate, with his Rooseveltian jowl but not the fingertip political sensitivity of FDR, was a selection of losers from the '68 and '72 liberal efforts. They had missed out on Carter for one reason or another and were now after yet one more shot at the White House limousines and the special importance that goes with being a special assistant to America's suffragan monarch. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s boy Stephen, who worked for Bobby in 1968, explained about that year: "It was our moment in history. We felt a real sense of loss, and we wondered, was our time ever going to come?" There has always been about those in the Kennedys' retinue a feeling that they were cheated out of their due by the assassins, that what the random gunfire of political crazies stole from them, history should make up.

Other people had other things to compensate for, notably the hacks and hackettes of Washington's corpse de press. The media's pro-Kennedy bias in 1960 and 1968 was so marked it's still remembered with awe. The pack, with wagging tails, emitting sweet guttural sounds of love to Jack and Bobby, bared its collective canines and snarled at Baby Brother. The princeling would pay. This time nobody would sneer that the First Amendment had been traded off for a luncheon invitation at Ethel's. So this time they did what they ought to do all the time, and showed him for what he was—an ineffectual lifeguard and little else.

In essence he did not differ from his Georgia opponent, so he began his campaign offering little more than that amorphous quality called leadership. For all anyone knows, leadership simply means reading the UN resolutions before telling Ambassador McHenry to vote for them. When the ayatollah's protégés put the snatch on the fifty Americans, Philo Flub in the White House suddenly took on a Napoleonic aura, thus demonstrating that, to some extent at least, leadership is in the eyes of those being led. Followership became fashionable, and Teddy was up the proverbial Iowa cornfield completely husked.

An encounter with Teddy in an interview when he hasn't been thoroughly briefed leaves you wondering if he isn't a bit dumb.

His had been a lupine strategy from the start, not one founded in a deep or distinct conviction about where America or his party should be going. During Carter's White House squat, no senator had been more consistently supportive. Thus it was Mr. Lupus the wolf, not Sir Teddy the enraged moralist, who split with the President. The plumpish Massachusetts carnivore would trail after the Georgian's flock and whenever a weakling would lag behind, our hunter would pounce.

A few of these stragglers, like Israel, may prove meaty. Neither Hubert Humphrey nor Scoop Jackson, alive or dead, can be accused of giving more support to our principal Middle East ally than Senator Teddy. Call it vote-pimping of the most transparent sort, he may still luck out. American Jews who are emotionally connected to Israel—let it be said many are not—have had misgivings about Carter for several years. Those misgivings may have solidified into unalterable mistrust after the debacle of the UN resolution recantation.

Not that there aren't ample reasons to mistrust Teddy. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Kennedy has fathered an entire rewriting of the U.S. Criminal Code. It is a document that pushes civil libertarians alternately into rage and despair. Containing not only what amounts to preventive detention and a violation of the protection against double jeopardy by permitting the government to appeal sentences it deems too short, the bill, S. 1722, could make life miserable for people with heterodox ideas. These kinds of people, the sort the government likes to spy on, will find out that under Senator Teddy's new law it will be a crime to rip out the microphone the FBI has planted under your pillow.

The conspiracy statutes, the most convenient legal tools

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At the least, Teddy's performance reflects a large voter opinion that Carter's talents are best-suited to growing peanuts.

against dissent, have been broadened. You can now be convicted of a conspiracy if one of your alleged coconspirators, without your knowledge or permission or even against your desires, solicits someone to commit an illegal act. Solicitation is enough; the act need not be committed and some of the acts defined as illegal would include civil disobedience at a piece of ground where a utility plans to build a nuclear power plant. Here is an example of what might happen, as provided by John Shattuck of the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington office:

"An antinuclear group is conducting a very vigorous demonstration at Seabrook, and one of the speakers takes it upon himself to urge the demonstrators, or anyone in the audience, to enter the grounds of the facility and attack some of the physical facilities, like chomping through a pipe. No one accepts the invitation. Nothing of the sort happens. Yet, under S. 1722, the speaker can be charged with soliciting the crowd to engage in criminal entry. . . . The criminal charge itself would empower the FBI—under the bill's expanded federal power—to infiltrate the organization holding the demonstration in order to monitor its future activities."

LIBERALS, YOU SEE, ARE NOT ALWAYS civil libertarians, so Mr. Carter—concerned as he is about freeing the CIA from the bonds of Congressional servitude—will not be heckling Kennedy about S. 1722. Jimmy and Teddy may end up quarreling in public over draft registration, but Little Bro's opposition arises out of the campaign's wolf tactics, not principle. As soon as Carter asked for it, Kennedy sunk fangs into his back and again lucked into picking up a degree of support from some concerned collegians. His anticonscription feelings are newly sprung, however, as this 1971 quote attests: "I would support a volunteer army in peacetime. But when American men are dying in Vietnam, Cambodia and perhaps now in Laos, I believe a volunteer army is both unwise and inequitable. . . . In addition to the compelling moral argument for imposing the risks of death on all classes of society equally, there is the issue of political wisdom as well. I frankly do not want to insulate middle- and upper-class Americans from the horrors of war."

It is the fate of all contemporary politicians who lack a firmly principled party base to follow trends rather than setting them. Like one of his sailboats Teddy comes around to fly nicely before the prevailing winds, unlike Bobby, say, who did his 180-degree swings abruptly. So as decontrol became trendy, the Teddly One came under the influence of a Harvard professor named Stephen Breyer, who sold him on airline and trucking deregulation. It may have helped convince a few people that the candidate wasn't one of those "sixties liberals" afflicted with cranky dogmatisms. Better to define him as a classic eclectic, a senator with presidential ambitions, in the political cafeteria, selecting or eclecting a little deregulation, several mountainous dollops of national health insurance, a generous spoonful of government subsidies for synfuel development, and so forth and so on until he reaches the cashier—whereupon he must decide whether to charge it or pay for it now. As a senator he has been accustomed to shouting, "Put it on the cuff." But this year the trend is toward posturing parsimony, so his call is "Don't put quite so much of it on the cuff." To be fair to the man, he differs from his opponents only in the arrangement of comestibles on his tray. He hasn't switched diets.

Nevertheless, his prospects aren't bad and his accomplishments in the campaign barely stop short of being prodigious. Look at what the Baby Brother has done. He begins the campaign with no particularly distinctive set of political proposals, with the mass media waiting to dry-gulch him, with a national reputation for vice and improper conduct, and goes on to get 25 to 30 percent of the vote in primary after primary against a sitting President who is a fellow Democrat. This is practically unheard of, and it is even more astounding for it to occur at a time of patriotic whoop-de-do when all are told to rally about the President.

At the minimum Kennedy's performance reflects a large voter opinion that James Earl Carter's talents are more suited to growing peanuts than dressing up in grown men's clothes and playing President. As the foreign policy crisis gimmick wears out from overuse, Kennedy, having squeezed Jerry Brown pretty much out of contention, may find himself being a very serious challenger. A lot of people may go for him on the basis of better a scoundrel in private affairs than a *stumpf* in public ones.

Carter's inability to get the fifty hostages out of Iran may end up hurting him more than it helped him. He's been winning the early primaries by saying he's got to stay home at the Casa Blanca to work on freeing our fellow citizens. No time for self-serving vote harvesting. A frustrated Kennedy was unable to dare, taunt, or trick him into debating or even campaigning. But what is Carter going to do if voter sentiment begins to run against him and the hostages still aren't free? He's walled himself into the White House by repeatedly saying he can't leave until our people are out of Iran. It is imaginable that he will be forced to stick to his word rather than look like a liar, while Kennedy is out on the loose, campaigning and cutting down a Carter who dares not leave the White House to do battle with him.

Kennedy's support of controls may also help him, even with big business. After all, look who adored John Connally, and we know his record on controls. As the inflation-caused panic among the nation's creditor groups grows, they may join the existing numerical majority who, according to the public opinion surveys, favor controls. At that point, Teddy, instead of looking outrageously liberal, may be viewed as the embodiment of bold leadership, clear policy innovation, and any number of other favorable clichés, while Carter may come to be regarded as a presidential paraplegic by a nation that has turned against helping the handicapped.

Mamas' boys, the last-born, youngest children, are supposed to be the crybabies who quit and go home. There is just an outside chance that Teddums will turn out to be Mommy's little tough nut and—like so many other youngest sibs—the happy, indulged, effortlessly lucky one.

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PERILS OF THE PERSIAN GULF

INQUIRY asked seven American foreign-policy analysts and political figures to comment on what the Carter Doctrine portends for the future. Their unanimous response: nothing good.

THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING, THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING

By EUGENE J. MCCARTHY

THE COMMUNISTS ARE coming again, and so is the Cold War. The Communists are coming again but by a route different from the route or routes they were supposed to have come by in the 1950s, in the 1960s, and in the 1970s.

In the 1950s it was the Russian Communists: They were coming by bomber over Alaska, the North Pole, and Canada. This moved the United States to set up, at great expense, an early warning system known at various stages as DEW line and SAGE—a system that was deemed both unnecessary and obsolete even before it was finished—and also to deploy at strategic airfields fighter-interceptors designed to control the northern air access to the United States. In the 1960s, following the emphasis on the missile gap by candidate John Kennedy (even though it was discovered after the campaign by the new administration that the gap which did exist was in our favor), the word that determined weapons procurement was that the Russians' missiles were coming. After the naval confrontations that were part of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis, and the subsequent Russian build-up of submarines and naval strength, some suggested they might also be coming by submarine.

In the late sixties, along with the Russian missile threat, a new Communist threat was perceived, that of the Communist Chinese. They were on their way first via expansion to Vietnam and then, according to the projections of Dean Rusk, into all of Southeast Asia, possibly to Australia. This combination of new

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threats—along with the old threat, the Russian threat on the eastern front in Europe—moved Secretary of Defense McNamara to devise a plan of preparedness for what he branded two and a half wars: one nuclear war, one conventional war—that is, one using the weapons of World War II with some improvements—and a half-war of special forces and guerrilla activities. Vietnam, it was anticipated, would be such a half-war. As we learned from the Pentagon papers, there were contingency plans for nearly every conceivable political confrontation, and procurement programs to provide weapons in anticipation of such contingencies.

The Nixon administration accepted Rusk's projection and pursued the war in Vietnam while increasing our readiness for the other two kinds of war. Secretary of Defense Laird announced that in the Nixon administration, the United States would be prepared not only to match and surpass the military strength we knew our enemies the Russians had, but to surpass their potential military strength and beyond that, to stay ahead of the momentum of that potential.

The Carter administration has discovered a Russian threat in a new and different part of the world. The Russians are now coming first through Afghanistan, then possibly through Iran, possibly through Pakistan. Russian armor is, according to that student of military history, Jody Powell, astride one of the historic routes of invasion from Afghanistan into Persia. Lord Carrington, foreign secretary to Her Majesty the Queen of England, and someone representing the Cronkite news, have both had a look at the Khyber Pass. Other students of military history, with reputations comparable to that of Jody Powell or possibly of somewhat better reputation, see the Russian move in Afghanistan as a step on the part of the Russians toward achieving their centuries-old dream of a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean.

President Carter, having discovered suddenly that the Russians are not to be trusted, has responded with vigor on all two and a half fronts. He has withdrawn the SALT treaty from the Senate, moved forward on the mobile missile program, and has urged deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Pentagon has ordered 750 new tanks. New aircraft procurement and naval procurement are in the works, with a 5 percent increase above inflation recommended for the defense budget. The President has talked about increasing our military strength in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf area. He has announced that we are moving forward to develop a quick-strike force, apparently to be different from the marines of earlier times and different from the Special Forces of Secretary McNamara. And back home, a minor resurgence of the Cold War against domestic subversion or possible subversion, which marked the forties and early fifties, is evident in the quickness with which Vice President Mondale has suggested that critics of administration policy in Iran and in Afghanistan are lacking either patriotism or courage—now called backbone.

The situation has all of the ingredients for a revival of the Cold War. ❏

THERE'S MORE TO THE WORLD THAN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION

By LES ASPIN

RECENT ACTIONS BY THE Carter administration do suggest a shift to a new Cold War policy in two senses—first, an increasing emphasis on military solutions to political-economic problems; second, an increasing tendency to view all of world politics through the prism of East-West conflict.

President Carter is correct in urging that we shift our defense posture to provide some military capability in the Indian Ocean. I do *not* believe that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a deliberate step in some drive toward a "warm-water port." However, the Soviets have been known to exploit unstable targets of opportunity. The Persian Gulf is rife with such potential targets, and if there is *no* response from the West, the Soviets may indeed, at some point, be tempted to go farther.

It is too soon to tell just what the "Carter Doctrine" is; early indications, however, suggest moves in the wrong direction. To view the world as one tangled web of superpower politics would be to repeat the worst mistakes of American foreign policy over the past thirty years. The United States would again become associated with unstable, unpopular regimes doomed to failure; after the downfall the survivors would view "American imperialism" as their natural enemy and, perhaps, the USSR as their logical ally.

The resurgence of a foreign policy excessively influenced by a bipolar view of international affairs is reflected in deteriorating relations with our traditional allies. Instead of working for common decisions on common problems, the administration has recently been making decisions unilaterally—later pressing our allies to join in, and whining "Which side are they on?" when they don't do so. It is no accident that Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing do not think highly of Carter; nor that the Western Europeans are beginning to forge an independent foreign policy, believing that the United States cannot be trusted to lead competently.

Similarly, the administration does not fully recognize the need for more cooperation with indigenous powers in making policy concerning regions we consider critical. A strictly unilateral foreign policy, one that takes little account of local needs and sociopolitical dynamics, is bound to meet failure.

The administration is also committing the classic Cold War blunder of enormously increasing the defense budget and providing virtually limitless arms transfers abroad when it can't think of what else to do. Certainly a strong defense and military aid to allies are necessary; but they are only one—and rarely the most important—dimension of a sound and effective foreign policy.

A still graver consequence of a new Cold War may be the death of all efforts to control nuclear weapons, including the quite modest SALT II treaty. The avoidance of nuclear war and the reduc-

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tion of expenditures for nuclear arms are goals of at least as much interest to us as to the Soviets. A new, totally unleashed arms race will make an already tense world still more tense and may heighten the chance that the Cold War will turn hot. Even with détente on the wane, arms control must be pursued; it has indispensable virtues on its own terms.

In general, a new Cold War will not be nearly so successful for the United States as was the original. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States truly did dominate half the world. Our nuclear arsenal far exceeded that of the Soviets. Europe was weakened in all ways by world war. The Third World lay underdeveloped and its leaders had not yet learned how to deal cleverly with larger powers.

In the 1980s, on the other hand, the United States does not so thoroughly dominate. The Soviets long ago attained nuclear parity. Europe is a major economic power in its own right. Many Third World nations have learned how to manipulate trade and diplomatic relations to serve their own interests. It is, in short, a more diverse world, one in which military power and economic power do not always mesh. And this world is not so conducive to the sort of superpower management and manipulation that a Cold War politics demands.

We must act to deter the Soviets from adventurism, but not to the exclusion of cooperative ventures. We must develop regional security policies dealing with the economic and political instabilities that often spark military conflict. President Carter realized this during his first three years in office, but only dimly; he did not know how to translate his visceral feelings into a consistent policy. Now some of his advisers are close to convincing him that the policy itself was all wrong, and that a military-minded policy that sees world politics as largely bipolar is correct.

It must be recognized that Soviet-American relations inevitably have strongly competitive elements. For many years to come, the superpower relationship will be the dominant one in world politics. It will not, however, be the only one. An obsession with this one aspect only distorts the view of all other aspects—and frequently, as demonstrated in recent history, leads to counterproductive policy.

THE LEGACY OF THIRTY YEARS OF BUNGLED U.S. IMPERIALISM

By WALTER LAFEBER

*SHORTLY AFTER THE HOS*tages were seized in Tehran, and before Russian troops moved toward Kabul, a top Soviet foreign-policy official reportedly unloaded on his American counterpart. For more than thirty years, the Russian complained, Moscow had allowed Washington to dominate Iranian affairs. All the Soviets had asked was peace and order in the area. Now the Americans had proven to be dangerously inept imperialists. The Soviet official implied that Russia, in its own way, would have to restore order to its boundary areas and clean up after the Americans.

His conclusion was questionable, but his sense of history was unerring. In 1946–47 the United States indeed assumed responsibility for Iran's stability. This marked a historic turn. A 1907 convention had divided Persia into a Russian sphere of influence in the north and a British protectorate in the south. England developed its holding into one of the world's great oil reservoirs. The Soviets, however, had to turn inward and were satisfied with a 1921 treaty in which the Tehran regime recognized their right to move troops across the border if Iran was used by a third power to threaten Russia. (The Soviets claim, in 1980, that the 1921 treaty remains in force.) In 1942 the arrangement became a triangular relationship when the United States moved in to ensure that the present shah's father did not follow his strongly pro-Nazi inclinations.

The next four years both shaped and previewed the present crisis. When FDR met in 1943 with Churchill and Stalin at Tehran, the President was so appalled at slum conditions (the leaders had to be rushed to meetings through back streets to avoid mobs), that he determined to remake Iran in the image of New Deal America. As an economic panacea the New Deal unsurprisingly proved as ineffective in the Middle East as it had in North America. The British meanwhile worsened an already tense situation by buying up any land that faintly smelled of oil. The Soviets, viewing themselves as full partners in all enterprises, did the same in their northern sphere.

Roosevelt and the State Department then turned on their allies. Washington announced that any new oil concessions must await a postwar settlement. (The settlement never occurred.) FDR tried to sweeten the pill by telling Stalin the Soviets deserved oil concessions and a guarantee that they could use the Trans-Iranian Railway for access to the Persian Gulf.

As the Cold War took root in 1945, FDR and Harry Truman repudiated those promises. Stalin retaliated in 1946 by refusing to remove the Red Army, which was propping up a pro-Soviet regime in northern Iran. At a climactic moment in this confrontation, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes smashed one fist into the other, declared that he was going to give it to the Russians "with both barrels," moved a U.S. fleet into the area, and told the Soviets to get out. Stalin did so, partly because he thought he had made a deal with the Iranian government to protect Soviet interests. Encouraged and protected by the United States, however, the Iranians repudiated the deal, and Stalin suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat. Americans replaced the bankrupt British as the major foreign presence in the area. The CIA operation of 1953 that overthrew a nationalist regime and restored the shah to the Peacock Throne only reconfirmed American dominance.

At least two conclusions can be drawn from this encapsulated history. First, Soviet interests in Iran have been validated by proximity, treaties, the British, and American officials. Second, despite those vital interests, Russian officials have been willing to live with their 1946 defeat as long as their border area was orderly and the Iranian government proved cooperative. (The shah, for example, helpfully arranged oil and gas

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deals with Moscow.)

Order has now disappeared along with the shah whom the United States backed for three decades. A new Cold War has erupted in an area where the historical legacies are an explosive mixture of long-recognized Soviet interests, the failure of U.S. imperialism, and, of course, the 1921 treaty that is at the disposal of angry and frustrated foreign-policy officials in Moscow. ❑

OVERREACTION ABROAD EQUALS LEADERSHIP AT HOME

By BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

CONTRARY TO PRESIDENT Jimmy Carter's hyperbolic words, the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan is not "the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War." The Carter administration, probably spurred by national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, has overreacted to recent events in Afghanistan. So far, unfortunately, this strategy—following upon Carter's skillful exploitation at home of the Iranian crisis—has proved to be good politics in America. His muscular foreign policy has met the earlier demands for "leadership" and "decisiveness" in the White House and hobbled Kennedy's candidacy.

For Carter, anxiety about Soviet purposes and a quest for domestic political support have coalesced into a "get tough" policy: a warning that the Soviets may be moving toward the Indian Ocean, the enunciation of a vague but belligerent "Carter Doctrine," the call for a rapid deployment force, and renewed promises of more defense spending. Such policies follow upon his earlier provocative decisions to develop the new MX, a mobile, powerful missile, and to place about six hundred nuclear missiles in Europe.

Deftly the administration has played upon the patriotism and anxiety of Americans to raise its political stock and to promote a dubious interpretation of international events. In explaining the Afghan crisis and the earlier Iranian crisis, the administration has wrenched events out of context and denied the relevance of recent history. In the case of the seizure of the hostages, for example, the administration has refused to acknowledge publicly that Iranians have legitimate grievances against America. The United States had long shored up the shah, directed the 1953 coup to restore him to power, and then arranged for American oil companies to gain about a third of Iranian oil.

In summer 1979, American officials in Iran warned Washington that admitting the shah to the United States would fuel hostility in Iran and might even provoke an attack on the American embassy. The American government should not have been surprised by the later attack, though it undoubtedly did not foresee the particular act—seizure of hostages. Carter has refused to acknowledge that American actions provoked the seizure. When Edward Kennedy, running his luckless campaign, tried to raise the issues of the savagery of the shah's SAVAK and to suggest American complicity in its crimes, the administration and the press skewered the senator. He was not being patriotic, they charged, in diverting attention from the immediate crisis (the hostages) to its causes (American acts).

In explaining events in Afghanistan, the administration has again banished history, torn issues out of context, and left Americans ill-prepared to understand events. Afghanistan has been in the Soviet sphere for at least the last two years, and since the 1950s that nation has depended on the Soviets for economic and military assistance. Since April 1978, there has been a Soviet-backed regime. By summer 1979, the Soviets had a few thousand military advisers in the country, their pilots were flying missions against the rebels, and about five thousand Soviet civilians were in key government ministries.

The question, placed in historical context, is why did the Soviets militarily intervene and thus *expand* their role in Afghanistan and their efforts against the rebels there? The Soviet act was unprecedented only in a limited sense: The Soviets in the post–World War II era had never sent their army *outside* Europe into a neighboring country in their sphere. In this case, they feared an unstable regime in Asia, threatened by Moslem militancy, on Soviet borders. Like most great powers, the Soviets wanted the security that stability could provide; they feared the insecurity that instability bred.

An unstable Afghanistan was threatening in at least two ways: It invited foreign intervention, and the militancy might provoke difficulties among the forty million or so Moslems in the Soviet Union. By late 1979, there was already some evidence of foreign involvement in the Afghan rebellion: Pakistan allowed the rebels to operate training camps. Moreover, the Chinese were probably providing them aid.

Some have suggested that there may have been CIA military aid to the rebels even before the Soviet armed intervention. Recently, the *Washington Post* reported that after the invasion the United States was supplying the rebels with "small arms and relatively simple anti-tank weapons. . . ." Such action dramatizes how easily the United States could act covertly to aid the rebels, undermine the Soviet-backed government, and promote the crisis on Russian borders.

American leaders have concluded that only a "get tough" policy will stop the Soviets from their alleged movement to the Persian Gulf. Such an analysis again distorts the context of events: The Soviets invaded (they claim they were invited by a puppet state, as the United States was in Vietnam) Afghanistan a few weeks after the United States won NATO approval to place in Europe 600 nuclear missiles capable of hitting the Soviet Union. That American-directed decision undoubtedly added to Soviet fears of encirclement and made the Afghan venture, in the Soviet view, more critical.

Soviet statements, even before the invasion, expressed a fear of encirclement by NATO and especially West Germany, the United States, China, and even Japan. Looking at the world from their perspective, the Soviets see the major

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powers as potential enemies, and much of their military buildup in recent years has been a response to that fear.

Even before the invasion, SALT was in great difficulty in America and the administration was escalating the arms race. Most notably, in addition to the NATO nuclear buildup, Carter had committed himself to 200 powerful MXs which, when developed, will deploy 2000 very accurate warheads. The MX will have the capacity to destroy most of the Soviet land-based ICBMs, which represent about 70 percent of their nuclear arsenal. Fearful Soviet leaders might well worry: Why had the United States moved to develop a weapon that might allow a first strike?

From the Soviet view, with détente collapsing and SALT II unlikely to pass, stability in Afghanistan looked more important. There were few inhibitions on intervening in Afghanistan. The Soviets had more incentive to deal with the crisis there and less reason to worry about offending America.

The American response of massive aid for Pakistan (now stalled) and assistance to Oman and Somalia in return for naval bases will further destabilize the area, tie us more closely to troubling regimes, and add to Soviet fears of encirclement. (How would the United States respond if the Soviets created naval bases in a few Latin American nations?) And the administration's bellicose responses have also left many NATO allies uneasy. Unlike the Carter administration, they do not believe that the Soviet Union is threatening Middle Eastern oil, on which they heavily depend. They do not want renewed tensions with the Soviets. Détente met their needs, and American bellicosity does not.

Ultimately, the administration's strategy may prove to contain the seeds of its own destruction. Some other major oil-producing nations in the Middle East may follow the lead of Kuwait in proclaiming that an increased American military presence in the Gulf area is dangerous and unnecessary. And the German approval of European-based nuclear missiles, contingent on the passage of SALT II, may well come unstuck when SALT unravels. Ultimately, then, other nations may partly restrain this administration from creating dangerous "situations of strength"—to use Dean Acheson's Cold War phrase.

WHERE ARE THE ISOLATIONISTS NOW THAT WE NEED THEM?

By EARL C. RAVENAL

THE ONE THING ALMOST everyone—doves as well as hawks, liberals and conservatives—will say about Afghanistan is that we can't "just sit on our hands." But why not? That sounds like precisely what we ought to be doing. If we can't prudently do something that is directly helpful—for example, free Afghanistan immediately, painlessly, costlessly, risklessly, from Soviet occupation—then we should be making the least of it, not the most. If we can't "defend" the Persian Gulf from halfway around the world, and if all we have, in the first resort as well as the last resort, is the threat of blowing up the planet, then we should be hedging against the deprivation of oil, not planning to start World War III. That is the essence of the noninterventionist position in this crisis. In short, sitting on our hands.

These are times that try the souls of noninterventionists. Worse, perhaps, than the vindictive hawks are the repentant doves, who feel personally outraged at the Russians for making a mockery of earlier dovish notions of how the world works. "Betrayed, yes, that's the word," complains Senator Ed Muskie. Russia "just ran out on us." George Ball, the old reliable devil's advocate of "hopeful" diplomatic solutions, now wants bigger defense budgets; more airlift, sealift, marines, and bases throughout the Middle East; revival of the draft; and urgent coercion of Israel into a settlement favoring pan-Islamic goals. Clark Clifford, who wisely persuaded Lyndon Johnson to abandon Vietnam, is peddling American arms and threats around South Asia. And so forth.

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The sunshine noninterventionists (those who, by the 1970s, had acquired the wisdom and the courage to oppose the "bad war" in Vietnam) have changed with the change in the political climate, with Afghanistan as a pretext. One summer, it seems, does not make a dove; and a few doves don't make a summer. But perhaps we shouldn't be too surprised. After all, sooner or later the liberals become the executors of the foreign and military policies of the right wing—though always, as they assure us, reluctantly, and always earning the contempt of the hawks for their efforts.

Russian motives for intervening in Afghanistan—though much discussed—remain less than completely clear. But I would be impertinent enough to suggest that discerning the precise sources of this season's Soviet conduct wouldn't prove a thing. What matters now is our own propensity to intervene, regardless of whether our intervention is holy or profane, whether we are welcomed or not, whether our aid is begged or disdained. What matters also is our own calculus of intervention—whether or not it is feasible within the constraints that beset our system and pervade the international system. Our recent experience confirms that intervention is likely to be expensive, risky, and fruitless—not in all cases, to be sure, but generally enough so that the whole enterprise should not be undertaken. Just preparing for intervention will be costly, as we see from the President's shopping list, and not only in terms of money: Private and public welfare will diminish, constitutional processes be distorted, citizens and their assets mobilized, bodies and minds regimented. Those costs are borne year in and year out, whether this or that intervention is a quagmire or a piece of cake.

The hawks greet the defections of the summer noninterventionists as proof that the nation is belatedly emerging from its comatose reaction to Vietnam—that "trauma," that "failure of nerve." But they miss the point. The real lessons of Vietnam are not the data of misplaced pop psychology; they are the costs of intervention that Vietnam made clear.

Some critics, reflecting on our predicament, are led to benign but wishful calls for new deals with the Russians. Sure, deals. . . . But what would they

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consist of? Any imaginable starting point would be post-Afghanistan and could lead only to a condominium of the two superpowers. They would be Nixon-Kissinger type deals, to wit: We let you run your part of the world, you let us run ours. And we would still need the threat of American force to make them stick. The trick, however, is to learn to live in a world without deals, without rules—an asymmetrical world, an unfair world, if you will. What is needed is a policy of nonintervention that is consistent enough to withstand a few tests by the Soviets and others in the months and years to come; one that recognizes and accepts that certain imperfect developments may well accompany nonintervention.

Prescriptions, anyone? In view of these realities, probabilities, and conjectures, Zbigniew Brzezinski and his crew have been looking for ways to multiply "linkages" to gain leverage and to reestablish American control. I say the less linkage the better. In a world interlaced with risks of nuclear annihilation, where geopolitics is becoming a prohibitively expensive game, we should be looking for ways to delink: to minimize provocations, to let regional conflicts burn themselves out, to "decouple" one stage of escalation from another, to compartmentalize the world's troubles, to separate trade, communications, cultural affairs, and yes, even sports, from matters of "high strategy." Indeed, we should keep "the national interest" out of the affairs of citizens and their private organizations. On both sides of the Cold War, cliques that call themselves governments presume to appropriate and manipulate the resources and activities of those who happen to live within their borders.

We are left with the historic dilemma of the mature imperial power (not "imperial" in the pejorative sense of the revisionist historians; the United States never behaved quite like that, though we were not much better off for having been relatively restrained and certainly reactive). As the international crisis deepens, the choices have narrowed to military intervention and what has been called "isolationism." The liberals had better stop calling names, because now the alternative to the official strategy of resuscitated military interventionism—as the administration falls back to Cold War II (or to a cold war that really never ended)—is an "isolationist" foreign policy. Indeed, what liberal critics have always refused to recognize, and still refuse to accept—is that American foreign policy, if it is to be redirected to nonintervention, must become not more wishful, but more "isolationist."

Where are the true isolationists, now that we really need them?

EVERYONE IN FAVOR OF A NUCLEAR WAR, PLEASE STAND

By Mark O. Hatfield

PRESIDENT CARTER HAS described the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the greatest crisis this country has faced since World War II. I strongly disagree with the President's assertion of the dangers posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and his proposed solutions to this Soviet challenge.

It now seems clear that the Soviets have made a profound mistake in invading Afghanistan. Consider the Soviet losses:

—A major portion of Soviet military forces is tied up indefinitely in a remote, mountainous nation.

—The hand-picked Soviet government is weakening, the victim of strikes and domestic revolt.

—Reportedly, more than two thousand Soviet soldiers have already been killed, and casualties are mounting daily.

—The strongest pro-Western nations in the Persian Gulf (such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt) have been reinforced in their opposition to Soviet communism.

—Anti-Soviet feeling in Iran has helped ease U.S.–Iranian tensions somewhat, perhaps providing the basis for release of the hostages.

—The Olympic Games in Moscow, worth billions in propaganda value, have been seriously damaged.

—The once tentative U.S.–China entente—something the Soviets have always feared—has blossomed into a full-blown international accord.

—The Soviets suffered one of the worst diplomatic setbacks in their history when the United Nations voted overwhelmingly to condemn the USSR's action in Afghanistan.

And the list goes on.

The greatest dangers of the "Carter Doctrine" lie in its overcommitment to defense increases and its dependence on the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that there are no major indigenous armies in the Persian Gulf region makes this situation historically unique. During the past thirty years of the Cold War in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, any fighting that involved U.S.–Soviet rivalry has been done largely by conventional proxy-armies of major strength.

For a U.S. military defense of the Persian Gulf, however, the proxy-armies of client states are nowhere to be found. Any conventional battle would be a direct, unprecedented conflict between the United States and Soviet troops.

Given the limited conventional strength that the United States can quickly project into the Persian Gulf region, a long-term battle with tanks and aircraft alone is unlikely. Because of this, U.S. officials have already acknowledged that the use of tactical nuclear weapons might be necessary to defend the region. These same officials, including Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and President Carter, have all indicated that any first use of nuclear weapons of any size would probably result in an escalation into an all-out nuclear war.

Nor is this lack of conventional forces, with the attendant danger of nuclear war in the region, likely to be significantly altered even after formation of the U.S. rapid deployment force (RDF). The conventional manpower needed for sustained defense of the 6000 miles of pipeline and half a million square miles of ocean and desert in the Persian Gulf area could easily require many times the troop strength available in the RDF. Any

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promise to defend the Persian Gulf region from internal or external attack is a military illusion. To preserve this illusion would almost certainly require the first use of tactical nuclear weapons. No natural resource is precious enough to justify the risk to civilized life entailed by any attempted nuclear defense of the Persian Gulf under the Carter Doctrine. Oil can be conserved, and even replaced with alternative sources of energy.

The projected five-year one trillion dollars in defense spending sanctified by the Carter Doctrine will most probably aggravate, not solve, the problems that confront us. It is an exercise in self-delusion to believe that large increases in U.S. weaponry or in tough talk could have prevented the Soviets from occupying Afghanistan. The United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly in 1956 and unquestioned strategic superiority in 1968. Yet this clear advantage did not have a noticeable effect on the Soviet military action against Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The forces likely to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan are across-the-board economic sanctions and a growing world disgust for the occupation and accompanying atrocities reportedly being committed against the Afghan people by the Soviet forces.

The one trillion dollars in military expenditures is a predictable and immensely costly symbol of renewed U.S. toughness. This decision will divert national resources and attention away from the deepest threats to our national security: massive dependence on foreign oil, and a breathtaking inflationary surge fueled by the burgeoning federal deficit. The military increase slated for the next five years, for example, could pay for President Carter's entire $80 billion synthetic fuels conversion program through 1995 and half of another such program. This could save millions of additional barrels of oil from the Persian Gulf. Dramatic incentives for energy conservation and mandatory gas rationing only for the immediate years ahead would add to these savings and lessen our vulnerability.

These steps will hurt, but a deeply troubled American population is willing to make sacrifices to reduce economic instability and the risk of an oil war in the Persian Gulf. Any heightened defense posture must include much greater contributions from our allies. Virtually every NATO nation spends substantially less of its gross national product on defense than does the United States: Japan spends less than 1 percent of its GNP. Yet most of these nations depend more on Persian Gulf oil than the United States does. With inflation higher than at any time in modern history, the U.S. public should no longer be asked to bear the defense burden of much of the free world. The formation of a common market in the West for defense expenditures and weapons production would show stiff, multinational resolve against any Soviet aggression, and a willingness to share in the common defense.

America's response to the invasion—in addition to rigorous energy conservation and firm demands for across-the-board economic sanctions against the Soviet Union—should include taking full advantage of the developing world's deepening mistrust of Soviet motives.

The opportunity exists to convert the international sense of outrage into positive action. The United States, through the United Nations, should call for the placement of a UN observer force on Afghanistan's borders with Iran and Pakistan. Although this force would by no means constitute a formidable military deterrent, it would serve as the tripwire against further Soviet aggression. Any military action against such a force would be seen as aggression against the entire international community.

The Soviet government can ignore internal public opinion, but not world opinion. The Soviets' historic insecurity with respect to their image suggests that they would think twice before taking on a force composed of members of the international community, including Moscow's Third World allies. The United States could further enhance its image by redirecting the grain not being sold to the Russians immediately to the poorest nations. This would serve to further contrast U.S. intentions with those of the Soviet Union, a country still mired in a costly and illegal invasion of a fellow sovereign nation.

The Carter Doctrine misjudges the fundamental threats to our national security. It demands a unilateral increase in U.S. defense expenditures. It vastly expands our global commitments into a region that cannot be effectively defended short of nuclear warfare. It diverts precious resources from the problems of energy and the economy that threaten our vital interests, funneling them instead into an already huge military arsenal. It effectively destroys an important U.S. initiative that would halt the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, by continuing to insist on sending substantial military aid to a dictator in Pakistan (who then announces he will refuse it because of strings attached). And it fails to take advantage of the staggering political setbacks to the Soviet Union in the developing world.

There are many creative responses to the challenge presented by the Soviet Union's dangerous and destabilizing action in Afghanistan. The Carter Doctrine is remarkable only in that it incorporates almost none of them. In the long run the doctrine will serve only to aggravate the sources of our national insecurity and add significantly and unnecessarily to the dangers of an increasingly perilous world.

COLD WARRIORS OF THE WORLD, UNITE

By STEPHEN F. COHEN

THE SOVIET INVASION OF Afghanistan and the hyperbolic reaction of the Carter administration have revitalized, almost overnight, the worst political rhetoric, fallacies, and—if our antidétente lobby has its way—militaristic policies of the Cold War years. We must begin, therefore, with what the Soviet invasion is and is not.

It is, of course, reckless and indefensible. It is not, however, the aggression of a revolutionary regime pursuing some blueprint for world conquest or even for control of Persian Gulf oil, but rather,

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the move of a profoundly conservative and fearful great power obsessed with the security of its border regions—in this case, with the prospect of an anti-Soviet Afghanistan or even an Afghan Tito on its southern flank.

Nor did the Soviet invasion trigger, as is now being said, a sudden breakdown of détente. It did, however, in Soviet eyes, occur in the context of a steady disintegration of American support for détente—disintegration that has been underway on the American side for several years. Moreover, the Afghan crisis is not necessarily the end of détente and the onset of Cold War II. Despite periodic and gimmicky redefinitions by a succession of politicians, détente has been developing since the 1950s. As such, it has survived other crises, including Berlin, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Vietnam, as well as other presidential campaigns. But there are, and always have been, factors working against an actual repetition of Cold War I, namely various mutual interests and institutionalized ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, neither great power any longer can lead its "camp" (or in the American case, even its athletes) into a renewed polarization of world politics.

Nonetheless, the current crisis is fundamental and thus exceptionally grave. As a process of undoing the antagonistic policies and psychological legacy of the Cold War, détente has depended since the 1950s on the vulnerable political fortunes of prodétente leaders and groups, and broader opinion in both the United States and the Soviet Union. But there has always been the danger of an unholy axis, even if inadvertent, between their cold warriors and ours. As I warned in this magazine more than two years ago [Dec. 19, 1977], such an axis was a possibility throughout the 1970s. It may, in the aftermath of the occupation of Afghanistan, become a terrible reality of the 1980s.

The dramatic inflation of American Cold War attitudes in recent weeks—as reflected in the administration's bellicose statements, public opinion polls, and the changed view of once-dovish politicians—is further evidence of how difficult it is to create a stable prodétente politics in the United States. The problem is no less severe in the Soviet Union, though that is rarely discussed in our public debates. The very idea of détente, with its necessary opening to the West, runs counter to deeply rooted Stalinist and older Russian traditions. Not surprisingly, it has been opposed from the outset by widely held attitudes, powerful interest groups, and individual leaders in the Soviet establishment.

Our hard-liners simply dismiss this crucial issue by insisting that there are no real policy disagreements among high Soviet officials, just as they once asserted, before discovering their new Chinese allies, that there were no real disagreements between Moscow and Peking. This is, of course, obscurantist nonsense. Rival groups, programs, ideological perspectives, and ambitions are rife in Soviet officialdom; such conflicts shape both domestic and foreign policy, and not only during succession struggles. Prevailing policies are regularly subject to challenge as a result of changing political circumstances inside the Soviet Union and, no less important, in international affairs. Therefore, the important point is not speculation about the extent of Brezhnev's personal power, but the fact than an important shift toward harsher policies, at home and abroad, has taken place in the Soviet establishment in recent years, and that American policy has contributed to this shift and thus to the political context in which the invasion of Afghanistan took place.

PRODÉTENTE SOVIET OFFICIALS have always been particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of American policy. They have had to argue, against not a little counterevidence, that the United States is prepared to recognize the USSR as an equally great power and to concede to it both military and political parity. This argument underlay, for example, their policies of SALT II and long-term economic assistance from the West. Soviet opponents of détente, whose more authoritarian domestic policies require the xenophobic image of an ever-present foreign enemy as well as a closing of the opening to the West, deny the premise and oppose the policies. For them, the United States remains an implacable foe who will seek every political and military advantage, undermine Soviet society and interests whenever possible, and renege on political, economic, and military agreements.

Many aspects of American policy toward the Soviet Union since 1973 have undercut prodétente Soviet officials and strengthened their opponents: the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, President Ford's disavowal of the word "détente," Carter's human rights campaign, the administration's drift toward a strategic alliance with China, Carter's military concessions to our anti-SALT lobby, the bizarre flap over Soviet troops in Cuba, and the decision to deploy Pershing missiles in Western Europe.

Throughout this period, as American promises on most-favored-nation treatment, SALT, and parity seemed to have been forgotten, one by one, Soviet disillusionment and hard-line sentiments have grown perceptibly. By late 1979, many Soviet officials must have concluded that there was little left of détente, in terms of gains to protect or mutual restraints worth abiding by. If their Afghan adventure now abets the worst elements in our political life, it is no less true that our hard-line, or at best erratic policies previously abetted their worst elements. This is the perilous dialectic, so to speak, of the hard-line elements on both sides, and of the present danger.

Can the dialectic be broken before it undoes years of progress in both countries? The rising tide of antidétente and even neo-Stalinist sentiment in the Soviet Union may be slowed by the extent of negative world reaction to the occupation of Afghanistan, especially in the Third World and the Communist movement—a reaction that probably was unexpected. And tenacious economic problems at home will keep at least that aspect of détente on the Soviet agenda. But much will depend, as before, on American policy. Although popular enthusiasm for Carter's alarmist rhetoric has abated somewhat, the Cold War impulse in American politics remains powerful. Meanwhile, the "Carter Doctrine" and the administration's moves to restore the draft reinforce the arguments of Soviet hard-liners, while grain embargoes enable them to stir anti-American sentiment among the Soviet people. Long-term decisions, including political succession, are being made in both countries. The signs are not good. ❏

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THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, edited by Alan Ryan, Oxford University Press, 297 pp., $15.95.

AGAINST THE CURRENT: Essays in the History of Ideas, by Isaiah Berlin. Edited by Henry Hardy, with an Introduction by Robert Hausheer. Viking Press, 448 pp., $16.95.

Subtle doctor

J. N. GRAY

IT WAS SAID OF MAXIM Gorky that he was "not a man, but a universe." Aside from any suggestion of impersonality such a description might convey, it applies with full force to Isaiah Berlin. The range and scope of his interests and achievements in philosophy, in political theory, and in cultural history are legendary. Still more striking, if possible, is the almost clairvoyant facility with which he has entered into the spirit of thinkers very remote in temperament from his own—thinkers like Marx, Fichte, Bakunin, and Belinsky. The extent of Berlin's intellectual sympathies is reflected in the breadth and complexity of his influence on those of radically different outlooks, in diverse disciplines. Faced with such a subject, the editor of a *Festschrift* confronts a daunting task, as Alan Ryan observes when he says that "to cover all of Isaiah Berlin's interests in one volume would have resulted in something which I imagine would have been unique among Festschriften—a volume physically too large and too heavy for its contributors to have offered to its subject." Instead we have a volume of fifteen essays on themes evoked by Berlin's *Four Essays on Liberty*.

The choice of *Four Essays* is a happy one, since that book contains all the major ideas with which Berlin's work has come to be identified, including Berlin's theme that, historically, at least two different conceptions of liberty may be seen as quarreling offspring of a common parent. One of these, the positive conception, soon mutated from being a bona fide view of freedom as self-determination into a pseudoconcept in which values distinct from freedom are misrepresented as aspects or dimensions of it. Thus it was that a conception of freedom with an honorable pedigree in the writings of Plato, the Stoics, Spinoza, and Kant became conflated with the idea of rational self-government under the aegis of strong public authority, which is the chief support of despotism in the modern world.

Contrary to the misinterpretations of many of its critics, *Four Essays* does not maintain that only negative liberty—the liberty in which a man's choices and activities are not obstructed by other men—is liberty proper. Rather, its argument is that there are compelling reasons for favoring the negative over the positive view. Among these reasons Berlin assigns priority to his claim that the positive view consecrates an immemorial error—the error, informing all the dominant traditions of Western civilization, according to which all genuine values and virtues cohere to form a harmonious whole. This is the presumption of Greco-Roman nationalism, as transmitted through the Scholastics to the French Enlightenment, which still largely dominates moral and political thought and sentiment. It implies that, at least in principle, there is for every moral and political dilemma a unique solution, so that real tragedy (where wrong is done whatever happens) is disqualified as involving a metaphysical impossibility. In *Four Essays,* as in all of his writings on social philosophy, Berlin is determined to undermine this ancient presumption. It may well be, indeed, that Berlin's outstanding achievement is to have subverted this common presumption of ancient and modern rationalism.

The fifteen essays in this volume approach the central theme of the connection between negative freedom, human choice, and the conflict of values from several angles. Three essays address directly the question of the nature of liberty. Gerry Cohen in his "Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat" argues that, notwithstanding its avowedly contractual character, the capitalist market economy necessarily involves limiting the liberty of workers. His essay states in a powerful form the classic argument against libertarianism—that voluntary exchange in the context of private ownership of productive resources presupposes the drastic and inequitable abridgment of social freedom. Radically misconceived as I believe Cohen's perspective to be, I have not seen a more cogent case for the view he expounds. Larry Siedentop contends in "Two Liberal Traditions" that French liberalism, with its more positive and sociological conception of liberty, captures insight denied to the narrower individualism of the British tradition. Charles Taylor, in a brisk piece entitled "What's Wrong With Negative Liberty," develops the idea that the negative view of liberty embodied in the writings of some of the leading British liberals is overly mechanistic and neglects essential dimensions of human action. Each of the three essays presents an ingenious argument, but one that is finally unpersuasive and fails to take the full measure of Berlin's exposition of classical liberalism. It is a pity that this collection includes no systematic defense of Berlin's conception of liberty.

It is no accident, perhaps, that the most provocative and important of the essays collected in this volume are concerned with Berlin's central doctrine of value-pluralism. Plainly enough, the claim that some central values are not merely uncombinable in the real world, but incommensurable—that there is no common measure or single standard to which appeal may be made to resolve moral dilemmas—has far-reaching implications for social philosophy. It may be, indeed, that the prospects for systematic theory in moral and political affairs are severely curtailed by such a

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claim. In a masterly essay, the distinguished jurist H. L. A. Hart considers the doctrines of rights recently advanced by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick, and concludes (in my view correctly) that, whereas each of these statements represents an advance on the crudities of utilitarianism, they fail to find an adequate foundation for a theory of rights because they are still conducted in the shadow of utilitarianism.

Hart's view that the way forward in political philosophy lies in decisively breaking with the utilitarian tradition is implicitly contested by Richard Wollheim; in an essay of formidable and characteristic subtlety he maintains that a form of indirect utilitarianism, traces of which he finds in the works of John Stuart Mill, can accommodate the competing values on which Berlin has always laid stress. In the most explicit and systematic consideration of Berlin's thesis of value-pluralism in this volume, Bernard Williams endorses the view that there are irreconcilable conflicts of value and suggests that this insight must give to moral and political theory a largely new shape and intent. The aspiration toward a moral geometry or a calculus in which all moral dilemmas can be expressed and resolved, must be abandoned, and political theory must be seen as an essentially public, practical (and indeed, political) enterprise.

*I HAVE NOT AIMED TO COM*ment on every essay in this valuable collection, but rather to assess those contributions in which Berlin's distinctive ideas are criticized or developed. If there is any single thought inspired by the volume as a whole, it is that Berlin's writings suggest a new path of justification of a liberal order. If Berlin is correct in his doctrine of value-pluralism, then the rationalistic variants of liberal doctrine, first advanced by John Locke and Immanuel Kant and now exhumed by John Rawls and Robert Nozick, are philosophical dead ends. Equally misconceived, if Berlin's arguments are sound, are the skeptical traditions of liberal thought, which try to ground the value of freedom in universal doubt. For Berlin's argument, far from expressing a form of skepticism, presupposes that there are values the conflicting demands of which are for us a matter of knowledge. The liberal society is then defended as one in which this knowledge is not suppressed or shirked, but rather, propagated and embraced. Authoritarian societies, resting on the chimera of universal rational harmony, are then condemned as expressing a sort of inauthenticity or bad faith, analogous to that analyzed by such existentialist and phenomenological writers as Sartre and Heidegger. Thus it is Berlin's central thesis that although the growth of knowledge does not necessarily or always promote the cause of freedom, only in a free society can it be acknowledged as a basic truth about the human situation that men must choose between ultimate ends.

In *Against the Current,* the third volume of Berlin's collected essays, his pluralism about values and his criticism of the rationalist assumptions of the Enlightenment surface in a variety of contexts. Berlin never imposes the pattern of his own preoccupations on any of the thinkers discussed in the thirteen essays in this volume, but it can be viewed as a coherent argument in its own right. The argument is directed against the most fundamental assumption of our intellectual tradition, the notion that reality constitutes a single unified field, capable in principle of being rendered fully intelligible in terms of a system of immutable and universal principles. Several of the essays are concerned with important antinomian thinkers who, often in great isolation, stood outside the frontiers of that tradition. Their writings have in the last four hundred years dealt blow after blow to what Roger Hausheer, in the marvelously perspicuous and sympathetic introduction to this volume, calls the "proud and shining column" of the Western rationalist tradition.

In his analysis in "The Counter-Enlightenment," Berlin sees such thinkers as Rousseau, Herder, and Hamann as undermining the secularized variant of the Western tradition that prevailed in France in the latter part of the eighteenth century. In their revolt against the cosmopolitanism of the French Enlightenment, these thinkers emphasized that men's personalities came to flower fully only in an enduring and specific cultural environment in which feeling is satisfied as well as intellect. Such thinkers identified the erosion of men's sense of moral security in the most progressive development of the modern world—in the growth of knowledge and commerce especially. Implicitly they contested the redemptive view that sees human history as tending toward some final perfection, which the thinkers of the Enlightenment—Condorcet, Turgot, Diderot—absorbed from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Indeed, as Berlin shows in a deeply interesting essay, "Hume and the Sources of German Anti-Rationalism," the opponents of the Enlightenment turned against it some of its most powerful weapons. Thus the philosophical defense of German mysticism was strengthened, paradoxically and fatefully, by the impact of Hume, whose "euthanasia of reason" seemed to bring the tradition of the Enlightenment to a skeptical impasse.

Berlin devotes two essays to a neglected thinker for whose passionate originality he clearly feels deep admiration—Giambattista Vico, the Neapolitan philosopher and historian who died in 1744. In "Vico's Concept of Knowledge" and "Vico and the Ideal of Enlightenment" he shows how Vico's distinction between two kinds of knowledge—the knowledge we have of things we have made ourselves and the knowledge we have of the natural world, which is given to us as a brute fact—shattered the ideal of a single scheme of concepts and categories that could contain all phenomena. In Vico Berlin also finds an innovation that was to inform much later social thought: Vico abandoned, for perhaps the first time in intellectual history, the assumption of a universal and in its essential aspects unvarying human nature, and initiated a current of thought in which it is acknowledged that men of different epochs and different cultures have radically different needs, values, and even perceptions. His innovations founded the modern tradition that subverts the idea of a single unified worldview and a universal civilization.

As Berlin himself doubtless intends, these wonderful essays leave a great many deep and difficult questions unanswered. His profound attachment to liberal values coexists with an equally profound doubt as to the rationalist schemes by which these values have typically been supported. How can liberal civilization retain (or regain) its self-confidence if its old philosophical supports are snatched away? Berlin's work points in a direction in which new foundations for liberal society may be laid; but, as he would be the first to admit, almost everything remains to be done. More specifically, liberal civilization, wherever it has flourished, has depended on economic freedom—on the institutions of private property and market competition. Without them all formal and legal guarantees of liberty become worthless. Berlin's writings show that the intellectual defense of the institutions on which the prospects of freedom depend is sorely in need of repair. It will be a hopeful augury if, among the many who derive benefit from reading

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his essays, there are some who seek to meet the challenge he poses to the philosophical and moral assumptions of the old liberalism.

A WRITER'S BRITAIN: Landscape in Literature, by Margaret Drabble, photographed by Jorge Lewinski. Alfred A. Knopf, 287 pp., $22.50.

English in context

DONALD DAVIE

THIS HANDSOME VOLUME looks at first sight like an unusually sumptuous brochure for the British tourist industry, but it is something else. Those who know Margaret Drabble from her novels as above all a dogged-as-does-it author, nothing if not deliberate and thorough, will realize that, unlike other writers of repute, she is probably incapable of supplying what used to be called "the letterpress" for a coffee-table picture-book. And indeed she has turned in something quite different. *A Writer's Britain* will disappoint anyone who buys it as a gift for someone who uses books as interior decoration, or as stimulus for casual conversation. Though it comes with clear and useful maps of England, Scotland, and Wales (Ireland isn't dealt with, not even Northern Ireland), it couldn't conveniently be taken along on travels in Britain; and even the armchair traveler will need to settle for several hours at a time in an armchair that is not of the softest.

Jorge Lewinski's excellent illustrations are what should give the clue. We all know by now that the camera *can* lie, and that it is the normal business of the professional photographer to make it lie most seductively; but Lewinski's photographs are, though expert and attractive, unspectacular. They are also, we discover when we start to read, keyed very scrupulously and self-effacingly to passages of the text—so much so that many of the pictures don't, in isolation from the text, explain themselves. The illustrations in fact illustrate. Whereas in coffee-table books photographer and writer collaborate on equal terms, if indeed it isn't the photographer who calls the shots, here the writer is firmly in the saddle and the photographer runs at her stirrup.

A Writer's Britain is more about writers than it is about Britain. That is not quite true; for it *is* about Britain, but Britain as a physical entity constant though changing through centuries, rather than Britain in the here-and-now around the tourist as he leaves his aircraft at Heathrow or Gatwick. In the first of five quite massive chapters—there is a sixth, less daunting, about British writers and British landscape in the present century—we know what we are in for as soon as our author takes on Sir Kenneth Clark, no less, challenging out of English and Welsh literature of the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages his contention that the experience of landscape as an aesthetic object or aesthetic stimulus is a relatively late-come phenomenon, not to be encountered before the Renaissance and rare still in the seventeenth century. This chapter is called "Sacred Places," and concerns itself with how the religious mind comes to terms with the seductiveness of the British earth, ranging from anecdotes told of the heroic anchorites and missionaries of the Dark Ages, through to Gerard Manley Hopkins and T. S. Eliot.



In the next chapter, "The Pastoral Vision," Margaret Drabble's sympathy with the egalitarian aspirations and resentments of British socialism gives her trouble as she is forced to struggle with the undoubtedly idealizing procedures of all pastoral literature, for instance with the way Ben Jonson in his great poem on Penshurst idealizes the hierarchical society symbolized by the manorial great country house. I suspect that she, like Raymond Williams who has wrestled with this problem before her, underestimates the extent to which not just pastoral literature but *all* literature (including for instance her own novels) is necessarily and unavoidably idealizing in tendency; how wide a gulf there is between the truth that honest literature deals with, and the sort of truth that we call "documentary."

She is admirably fair-minded as she forces herself to acknowledge the truth and the beauty of *The Seasons* of James Thomson, who in a vulgar Marxist view would have to be denounced as a Scottish lackey of the English ruling class; but we can sense her relief and enthusiasm when she's able to turn to those writers—John Clare, more dubiously Burns, and in a different way Cobbett—who see the landscape through the eyes of the agricultural *worker*, not the eyes of the privileged visitor to the manor. Her pages on Clare are really admirable, and at many points I think they genuinely break new ground in the appreciation of this very great and still neglected poet. After judicious looks at the novelists Elizabeth Gaskell, George Eliot, Trollope, and Hardy, this chapter ends surprisingly yet naturally with two poets of the present day, R. S. Thomas in Wales and Alasdair Maclean in Scotland, both writing of harsh and unrewarding landscapes.

In the next two chapters, "Landscape as Art" (largely about English gardens, and contrived or uncontrived "beauty-spots") and "The Romantics," the narrative pace at times deteriorates into a dutiful *trudge* through the names and ti-

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tles that "cannot be overlooked"; and one sympathizes with an occasional distraught gesture toward matters that must be mentioned but can't be dealt with properly—for instance the complicated aesthetics behind landscape gardening and "the picturesque," or Wordsworth's unstable relations with what he called "Nature." And yet it's just here that Margaret Drabble's virtue of conscientious thoroughness is most welcome; it's salutary to be reminded for instance of George Borrow and his *Wild Wales*. And Borrow is one bridge into the fifth chapter, "The Industrial Scene," where the author hits her stride again. We might expect as much from one who has championed Arnold Bennett, the novelist of industrial Staffordshire.

Lewinski is equal to the challenge, and his illustrations to this chapter seem to me, in a profoundly serious sense, poetic. (I instance particularly the color plates at pp. 219–20.) From John Dyer in the eighteenth century, sanguine and sure that industry and commerce could only beautify England, we are taken through the recognition—by Dickens ("the poet of pollution") for instance—that industrialized landscapes could be celebrated only as luridly *sublime* (as distinct from "beautiful"), to the often frenzied conflict of love and loathing that such landscapes provoked in D. H. Lawrence. It is typical of Margaret Drabble's thoroughness that she takes note of a belated celebrant of the industrial sublime in our own day, Jack Clemo, extraordinary proletarian poet of industrial Cornwall; and she rightly and staunchly recognizes as byproducts of industrialism the thinly green pockets of precarious suburbia, celebrated wistfully and ironically by the two poets of today most popular with the British public, Betjeman and Larkin.

I have called Margaret Drabble a *dogged* writer. It is a left-handed compliment at best, one may think, yet in the present instance I don't mean it so, as perhaps I have shown writing a dogged-as-does-it review. Nothing else seemed right for what is, when one thinks about it, an astonishing feat of synopsis: an introduction to the social history of Britain as well as to its literary history, and indeed by implication a contention or demonstration that no one can responsibly write the one without writing the other. That implication may be challenged, in ways I have suggested; but we need to come to terms with it never more than here and now, when the most influential critics, inevitably much more *brilliant* than Margaret Drabble can be, are at one in pretending that works of English, as of any other literature, can safely be studied, and fittingly appreciated, when they have been torn out of the highly specific historical and geographical matrix that they were hewn from.

***THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE*, by Edward W. Said. Times Books, 265 pp., $12.50.**

***ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY*, by James M. Ennes, Jr. Random House, 299 pp., $12.95.**

Mideast cover-ups

RUSSELL STETLER

NOW THAT PRESIDENT Carter is thinking about conscripting our sons (and perhaps our daughters) to fight for freedom on the sands of Oman, it is surely time for a national debate on U.S. Mideast policy. The two books under review are essential reading for that debate, and their appearance could not be timelier. *Assault on the Liberty* reminds us that thirty-four Americans have already been killed in an Arab-Israeli war—strafed, torpedoed, and napalmed by America's unquestioned ally Israel. *The Question of Palestine* is even more sobering. It not only reminds us of the Carter administration's most spectacular inconsistency (asserting that the Palestinian issue was at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict and then offering the Palestinians only "autonomy" under eternal military occupation in the Camp David formula). It also explains, in depth and detail, what "the question of Palestine" is.

The author of *The Question of Palestine* is Edward W. Said, a Western-educated Palestinian who teaches English literature at Columbia and also served in the parliament-in-exile known as the Palestine National Council. He is at once deeply involved with the internal politics of the Palestinian movement and with his life as a respected professional in an American intellectual milieu which he feels is less critical of Israel and Zionism than are the Israelis themselves. As a result, this is a very personal book, a unique synthesis of the inner vision of the self-conscious Palestinian experience and Western perceptions of that experience.

RUSSELL STETLER reported on U.S. policy in the Middle East for Internews from 1973 to 1978.

Said begins with a rigorous examination of Zionism: its close connection to late Victorian liberalism, the effect of its institutional presence in shaping contemporary attitudes toward the Arab world, and the special problems arising from the Jewish experience in twentieth-century Europe. Zionism arose and took hold in a world that had already made certain assumptions about the non-European races. Said recalls that even such thinkers as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx seem "to have believed that such ideas as liberty, representative government, and individual happiness must not be applied in the Orient for reasons that today we would call racist." The idea of substituting superior civilizations for inferior ones in distant lands was already firmly entrenched when Zionism made its appearance.

The depth of this conviction in otherwise enlightened minds is hard for us to appreciate today. Said notes that even the staunch anti-imperialist J. A. Hobson believed in the existence of "subject races." I am reminded that when Bertrand Russell went to jail for objecting to the First World War, he had taken pains to make clear that he did not object to all wars; he argued that "wars of colonisation" were fairly often justified. Writing in 1916, Russell explained:

> By a "war of colonisation" I mean a war whose purpose is to drive out the whole population of some territory and replace it by an invading population of a different race. . . . In modern times the conflicts of Europeans with American Indians, Maoris, and other aborigines in temperate regions, have been of this kind. Such wars are totally devoid of *technical* justification, and are apt to be more ruthless than any other. Nevertheless, if we are to judge by results, we cannot regret that such wars have taken place. They have the merit, often quite fallaciously claimed for all wars, of leading in the main to the survival of the fittest, and it is chiefly through such wars that the civilised portion of the world has been extended from the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean to the greater part of the earth's surface.

In the Victorian setting, the Zionists' callous attitude toward the existing population in Palestine was hardly surprising. At least they thought in terms of displacement—not military annihilation. In 1895 the early Zionist leader Theodor Herzl confided to his diary, "We shall have to spirit the penniless population across the border by procur-

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ing employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country." But in the implementation of the Zionist dream, displacement of the existing population also entailed an eradication of its cultural traces. Said quotes these remarks by Moshe Dayan in April 1969:

> We came to this country which was already populated by Arabs, and we are establishing a Hebrew, that is a Jewish state here. In considerable areas of the country we bought the lands from the Arabs. Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of those Arab villages, and I do not blame you, because these geography books no longer exist; not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. . . . There is not one place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population.

Said terms the result an "epistemological achievement"—"the sheer blotting out from knowledge of almost a million natives." Zionism created the optic through which the Western mind perceived the Middle Eastern reality. We saw only the Israeli underdog struggling against Britain in the forties (not native underdogs against new colonizers), the idealism of the kibbutz experiments (not the exclusion of non-Jews from kibbutz membership or the confiscation of Arab land to launch utopian dreams) in the fifties, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as a "model for future cooperation" between Jews and Arabs (*New York Times* editorial, May 2, 1976) in the recent past.

Said asks his American readers to face the facts. The Palestinians will not go away.

There are fascinating digressions on the impact of Zionism on such figures as George Eliot (in *Daniel Deronda*), Reinhold Niebuhr, and Edmund Wilson. What emerges is a subtle and textured account of Zionism. We see its provenance among the Victorian liberals, its growth in the twentieth century, and its mature security in a "community of language and ideology" shared with the West. The West and Israel resonate very deeply together, and, as Said recognizes, often for the best of reasons. But the result is a consensus that limits our understanding and renders important segments of political reality opaque and impenetrable. "The power of a consensus, of a tradition, of a coherent discourse such as exists between Israel and liberal opinion," writes Said, "is that its sheer institutional presence dispels any evidence to the contrary, flicks it away as irrelevant."

SAID BEGINS HIS CRITIcal, revisionist task by detailing how Zionism was experienced by the Palestinian population: the destruction of Arab villages, the confiscation of "absentee property," the centrifugal thrust into exile. "The absolute wrong of settler-colonialism," he admits, "is very much diluted and perhaps even dissipated when it is a fervently believed-in Jewish survival that uses settler-colonialism to straighten out its own destiny." The "real parallels" between Israel and South Africa are badly shaken up when the thinking Palestinian "reflects seriously on the difference between white settlers in Africa and Jews fleeing European anti-Semitism." Said has clearly written his book in the midst of this process of reflection; his answers are not final. But he insists on facing facts: for example, "that Israel is a state with, for Jews, real accomplishments, that it has the commitment of its people and many parts of the world, that Israeli Zionism and Palestinian resistance do not have the pristine, relatively uncomplicated characteristics of the black majority versus the white minority struggle in southern Africa."

Said asks his American readers—and ultimately U.S. policymakers—also to face facts, in particular the simple fact that the Palestinians will not go away. He asks the United States to join most of the nations of the world in recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of nearly four million Palestinians inside and outside Israel. Without claiming to speak officially for the PLO, Said does speak with an insider's authority in plotting the vector of its political evolution since 1967 and especially in the late seventies. He declines to speculate about future compromises the PLO might make in response to U.S. or Israeli initiatives, but he stresses that most Palestinians, at least of his own generation, have already accepted Israel's reality: The Palestine National Council has twice endorsed the so-called ministate on the West Bank—prompting no U.S. or Israeli response.

From personal experience Said argues finally that the Palestinians have made a remarkable achievement in their exile parliament—the only model of genuine political democracy in the entire Arab world. This experience, in his view, gives the PLO goal of a "secular, democratic" state an unusual authenticity. In the end, Said manages to write with an optimism that is rare in someone who recognizes the complexity of the situation and feels revulsion at mindless violence regardless of its origin. He believes that the "people of Palestine"—Jews and Arabs—will in the long run have an encounter of mutual benefit; he also expects that we Americans will learn from our past mistakes and adopt a foreign policy that will foster such an encounter.

Edward Said writes with the patience required to sustain distant hopes and dreams. Most of his rhetoric of outrage is soon qualified in calmer tones. His essay is a self-conscious first step in a long and tortuous journey. In *Assault on the Liberty*, James Ennes has modest, yet more urgent, ambitions. He wants to end what he considers a cover-up concerning Israel's attack on the U.S. intelligence ship *Liberty* during the June 1967 war. As a survivor of that attack, Ennes reveals little interest in the broader contours of U.S. Mideast policy or the Arab-Israeli conflict. He simply wants to document what happened and refute the official explanations. Readers will have to decide for themselves what it all means.

In brief, an unprotected U.S. electronic intelligence ship was moved into the war zone, close to the Sinai coast. Its electronic monitoring was in the UHF range—and hence required mainly line-of-sight reception, rather than safer, over-the-horizon listening in. A belated recognition of the danger to which the *Liberty* might be exposed produced a Marx Brothers scenario of misfiled cables and undeliverable orders from Washington. The world's most sophisticated military communications system couldn't tell its own spy ship to run for cover. One cable went to the Philippines instead of to the Mediterranean, an urgent order phoned to London wasn't passed on for four hours while some bureaucrat awaited confirmation on paper, and an ultimate message direct from the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to get through because the *Liberty* didn't subscribe to the "Top Secret" system that relayed it. The whole affair would have been high comedy had the cost not been measured in human life.

There is no doubt in the mind of Ennes that Israel attacked the *Liberty* intentionally. He describes the early

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overflights by slow-moving Israeli craft, recalls vividly how the ship's flag was visible, and disputes in meticulous detail the possibility of honest confusion between the *Liberty* and any Egyptian vessel (as claimed by Israel). His recollection of the horror of the attack is indelible. First came the Mirage fighter-bombers, then the swept-wing Dassault Mystère jets:

> In a technique probably designed for desert warfare but fiendish against a ship at sea, the Mystère pilots launched rockets from a distance, then dropped huge silvery metallic napalm canisters as they passed overhead. The jellied slop burst into furious flame on impact, coating everything, then surged through the fresh rocket holes to burn frantically among the men inside.

Torpedo boats closed in to complete the assault.

Thirty-four Americans were killed; Ennes was among 171 others who were wounded. In the midst of the Vietnam War, these casualty figures seemed to mean little except to the families they touched directly. The United States accepted Israel's apology for a tragic error; financial compensation was paid for the wasted lives. Bureaucrats bickered at length about whether the crew had earned "hostile fire pay." In the end, it was awarded only to the wounded.

Ennes raises many bitter questions about the performance of the navy and the Defense Department in handling the *Liberty* episode. Why was the story hushed up? Why were facts suppressed that flatly contradicted Israel's account? Did the absence of air cover to protect the *Liberty* embolden the North Koreans to seize the *Pueblo* seven months later?

Assault on the Liberty raises deeper questions only by implication: What was the *Liberty*'s mission? Did Israel attack the *Liberty* to prevent it from gathering intelligence on the impending invasion of Syria—a significant escalation of the war which U.S. diplomacy might have tried to thwart?

And what of the future? Does the projected U.S. presence in the Middle East not risk further tragedies even in the conflicts in which we avoid direct involvement?

The attack on the *Liberty* may suggest that in 1967 Israel was prepared to distinguish its interests from those of the United States—even when extreme measures followed in consequence. We might begin the great Mideast debate by attempting to distinguish our interests from those of our allies, including Israel, and that task also means putting the Palestinian question at the top of our agenda.

***SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION*, by Bruno Stein. Free Press, 308 pp., $14.95.**

Systematic robbery

CHARLES D. HOBBS

*I HAVE NOTICED THAT PEO*ple who write about things "in transition" are often apologists for lost causes, and Bruno Stein, author of *Social Security and Pensions in Transition*, is no exception. At a time when the defenders of social security are mostly welfare bureaucrats and Sunbelt congressmen, Stein puts his academic credentials—professor of economics and director of the Institute of Labor Relations at New York University—behind an elaborate attempt to justify the past, present, and future of social security.

He is not convincing, in part because he tries to disguise his work as objective history and constructive criticism. Beneath a thin veneer of objectivity he turns out to be as uncritically committed to social security as Southern apologists were to slavery before the Civil War, and he treats his subject with the same serene obeisance, impervious to unpleasant facts and differing values. For him the only inherently bad thing about social security is its critics.

Stein is also unconvincing because of what he neglects. I searched his book in vain for a discussion of the size and growth of social security in relation to other aspects of the economy. Yet the fact is that just in the past ten years social security expenditures have increased fourfold, at an annual rate of 30.5 percent. Projected expenditures for 1981 are $179.3 billion, which is 29 percent of the entire federal budget and 6.5 percent of the total GNP—up from 21 percent and 4 percent ten years ago. Not only does Stein not consider the impact of these facts; he does not even mention them.

Instead he takes the position that, whatever its size and structure, social security is a pawn, rather than a determinant, of the economy, that ". . . the success of a program that redistributes income depends on the economy's ability to generate income—real goods and services. Social Security is no exception to this rule." If social security is sick, it just has a touch of the economic blahs that are going around these days. When the inflationary epidemic runs its course and the economy picks up, social security will be restored to its normal good health. Of course, if the government does not find ways to increase productivity, "then more than a workable retirement system is at stake . . . what is at stake is our way of life."

That's laying it on a little thick. The trouble with this diagnosis is that social security is one of the principal contributing factors to the present economic crisis, touching virtually every American family. It depresses productivity and abets inflation. Taxing away the portion of earnings that workers might otherwise save and invest, and paying it out immediately in largely unearned "pensions," social security turns money that could be used to invest in productivity into accelerated consumer spending.

Not that people who get social security do not need it: Most find themselves today vacillating between bitter thankfulness for their social security "windfall" and the fear, well-founded, that one of these days the checks may stop coming. But the economic point is that for the most part they did not earn even the small benefits they receive, and their massive subsidization provokes the very inflation that makes the benefits inadequate.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW of the workers who are taxed to provide the benefits, social security is legalized robbery. A conventional pension plan would hold their contributions in individual trust accounts and pay them from the proceeds of investments made with those contributions. Social security, in contrast, takes their money and immediately pays it out to those who paid in earlier. When those who are paying now retire, they will collect the money paid in by workers being taxed then. There is no guarantee of return on investment because there *is* no investment, except in the promises of politicians. And their ability to meet social security promises in an inflationary economy depends on an ever-expanding group of new "investors" (taxpayers) and an ever-increasing "investment" (tax) rate.

The accumulation of future unearned

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benefits already promised by social security is a debt that will bury the next two generations of workers. Today's young worker will have virtually all of his potential personal savings and investments taxed away to meet that debt. His taxes will be so high that even if he outlives Methusaleh, after he retires he will never be able to collect the amount of his "investment" plus normal interest.

Stein totally ignores this inflation-increasing, productivity-decreasing effect of social security. But then, Stein is, first, an advocate of wealth redistribution, and only second an economist. He reserves his economist's tools, such as they are, for an attempt to refute social security's critics. His particular target is Harvard economist Martin Feldstein, who several years ago, in a classic econometric study, demonstrated social security's depressing effect on private savings and the growth of the GNP. But instead of carefully criticizing Feldstein's assumptions and techniques, he tries to cancel out Feldstein's findings by contrasting them with the findings of three other "experts," all of whom also happen to be social security apologists. The three shills chosen by Stein all come to slightly varying conclusions suggesting that social security has little or no impact on savings and economic growth; Stein would like us to conclude, along with him, that since all the studies disagree, none can be correct, and Feldstein's is probably the most incorrect.

The detailed, scientific refutation of the objections to Feldstein is obviously impossible here. However, anyone who pays social security taxes, and that is virtually all of us except civilian federal employees, knows from direct personal experience that Feldstein is correct about social security diminishing our ability to save. And if he is right about savings, by the very nature of his study he is also right about social security depressing GNP growth.

But if Stein is hardly credible in his attempts to refute Feldstein, he is even less credible in proposing a solution for social security's intergenerational problem, which will come to a crisis-point in the next ten to twenty years: The problem is first of all, the declining birthrate, and secondly, that more and more people are living longer and longer, reducing the ratio of taxable workers to beneficiaries. In 1940, 250 workers were paying into social security for every retired worker who was collecting benefits. By 1970 the ratio had fallen to 5 to 1. It is now 3 to 1, and in another twenty years it will be 2 to 1. Coming on top of the enormous unearned-benefits debt, this demographic quirk will, in all likelihood, cause the final collapse of social security sometime between 1995 and 2000.

What is Stein's solution? Long-range conversion of social security to a fully funded investment program? Private options to reduce government influence over people's working and retired lives? Never! Cut benefits? Raise the retirement age? Increase taxes? Sure, all of those.

And more. What Stein suggests as the true long-range solution is a diversion of government resources from programs for children, to social security. Stein concludes that government spending for children can be cut to fund social security shortfalls. One can just hear the applause with which Congress would greet *that* proposal from any President. Shame on you, professor; and in the Year of the Child, too.

What Stein overlooks, in the final analysis, is that the government-provided booty to be fought over by presumably needy children and their presumably needy grandparents is really the earnings of America's workers. Leaving more of those earnings in the hands of the earners will increase productivity and might very well lessen the problems of the needy without the high financial and social overhead of a government bureaucracy. It is in this direction, not in Stein's, that we must search for answers to the social security dilemma. ❏

***THE MAGIC OF DANCE*, by Margot Fonteyn. Alfred A. Knopf, 328 pp., $17.95.**

On point

THOMAS RUSSELL III

DANCE HAS BEEN LUCKY in print. It has attracted much more than its share of the intelligent criticism of the arts. (Compare, for instance, the cinema.) Even recent picture books about dance have been aimed less at the coffee table than the bookshelf. Lincoln Kirstein on the New York City Ballet and on Nijinsky, Natalia Makarova on herself, and now Margot Fonteyn on *The Magic of Dance*. By no coincidence, all of the above were published by Alfred A. Knopf, under the enlightened editorship of Robert Gottlieb, a board member of the NYCB. Gottlieb has nodded only once, in producing Charles Payne's unspeakable history of the American Ballet Theatre. A paranoid might be forgiven for thinking that book a devious NYCB plot to make its rival look foolish.

Like the Kirstein and Makarova books, Fonteyn's will be bought by many for its wealth of illustrations alone.

Fonteyn's analysis of and enthusiasm for male dancing is one of the strongest themes in the book.

(Relevant illustrations too; not like the recent reissues of Edwin Denby's two classic books with covers picturing Baryshnikov and Gelsey Kirkland, neither ever reviewed by Denby.) But, like the others, Fonteyn's offers so much more than pictures. Despite the kitschy title, this is no mere Time-Life extravaganza. Fonteyn's book is not a history as such, although it is, or at least includes, a rather rapid-fire overview of the history of dance. There are brief glimpses of a number of central figures, from Madame Vestris to Rudolf Laban (the latter a movement theorist whose Labanotation is the most common method of transcribing dance, and who helped develop labor-saving movements for wartime factory production lines—the first time-and-motion man?).

But Fonteyn's book goes way beyond that. Rather than presenting a series of "and then came . . . who was followed by . . . who was the first to . . .," *The Magic of Dance* in fact is organized less by its chapters ("Dance Universal," "Dance Imperial," etc.) than by a number of ideas, a series of themes. Surprisingly, most have less to do with dance per se than with social history; for what Fonteyn is about here is a social, not a technical history of dance. What interests her is dance not as something separated from its audience by a proscenium, but as an essential element in people's lives. For one of the great ballerinas of our

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time, dance is not primarily an event that takes place on a stage, but something that happens between men and women everywhere.

Thus Fonteyn focuses particularly on the relations among differing forms of dance, and the relationship of each to the society that produced it. She describes the mutual influence of social, folk, and stage dancing, noting the influence on the last of these and on its audience of such dances as the waltz, the apache, the tango, and the Charleston.

So, Fonteyn suggests, the nineteenth-century efflorescence of Russian court ballet owes less to the tsar's importation of foreign choreographers than to a rich native tradition of popular dancing. As she reminds us, "Russia is unique in that the two most ancient and basic types of folk dance, the Oriental and the European, converge on its border states."

Statements like that will seem like oversimplifications to some, but they reveal the vigor of her ideas. In a similar vein, Fonteyn remarks on the tardy birth of America's great musical form, jazz. She suggests that such a native strain should have grown out of a mixing of European and Native American cultures, as occurred in South America, where Spanish influence (and genes) melded with those of a variety of native populations to produce vibrant hybrid cultures. In Puritan—and although she does not say so, racist—America, however, there was virtually no such mixing, and an important hybrid culture had to await the importation from Africa of a whole new race. (Indeed, how could a society where, even after the Revolution, dance recitals had to be listed as "lectures," produce a native tradition of music or dance?)

Perhaps the key feeling we take away from this book is a sense of its author's generosity—not only that of a classic ballerina toward other forms of dancing, but of a woman toward men. For the book devotes much space to the recent reinvigoration of male ballet dancing. It was of course partly Bournonville's choreography and Nijinsky's dancing that rescued the male from his nineteenth-century fate as mere support for the ballerina, but Fonteyn provocatively suggests other influences as well, principally that of Fred Astaire. (She's not alone in that enthusiasm: Baryshnikov too has often named the man in top hat and tails as his golden idol.) Indeed, Fonteyn's analysis of and enthusiasm for male dancing is one of the strongest themes in the book.

Throughout she offers marvelous little details. We learn, for instance, that concealed behind stage flowers were toeholds on which the ballerina could stand on point (these were common in the late nineteenth century, but not altogether unknown to Fonteyn). We get extracts from letters, as when the great Austrian ballerina Fanny Ellsler accepts an offer to come dance in America although she has "a very indistinct notion of its whereabouts." We see the number of dancers burned to death during the brief period of gas lighting that followed candles and preceded electricity. We learn that flying on wires did not begin with *Peter Pan*, but was invented by Charles Didelot before the end of the eighteenth century.

For morsels like that, for vigorous thought about dance and its place in our lives, for contact with a generous spirit, for marvelous pictures, don't miss this book. ❑

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

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